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Abstract
People underappreciate how their own behavior and exogenous factors affect their fu-
ture utility, and thus exaggerate the degree to which their future preferences resem-
ble their current preferences. We present evidence which demonstrates the prevalence
of such projection bias, and develop a formal model that draws out both descriptive
and welfare implications of the bias. The model helps interpret established behavioral
anomalies such astheendowmenteffect, andhelpsto explain commonly observedsub-
optimal patterns of behavior such as addiction and excessive pursuit of a high material
standard of living. The model also suggests potentially welfare-improving policies,
such as mandatory ‘‘cooling-off periods’’ for certain types of consumer decisions.
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A person’s current well-being is typically influenced not only by her current consumption, but
also by such factors as her own past behavior, temporary fluctuations in her tastes, and changes in
her environment. When a person faces an intertemporal choice in a situation in which tastes may
change, she must make predictions about how changes in future states — all those factors besides
contemporaneous consumption — will affect her future preferences. For example, when a person
makes summer vacation plans during the winter, she must predict how she will feel in the summer;
and when a person decides whether to try crack cocainefor thefirst time, shemust predict howthis
consumption will influence her future enjoyment of activities, including consuming more crack
cocaine.
In this paper, we formalize and explore the implications of a general bias in such predictions:
People tend to underappreciate the effects of changes in their states, and hence falsely project
their current preferences over consumption onto their future preferences. Far more than suggesting
merely that people mispredict future tastes, this projection bias posits a systematic pattern in these
mispredictions which can lead to systematic errors in dynamic-choice environments.
In Section 2, we review extensive evidence for the existence of projection bias, highlighting the
diversity of situations in which projection bias occurs. Research suggests that people underappre-
ciate short-term, transient changes in preferences, such as those induced by fluctuations in hunger
or the presence of environmental cues, and slowly-developed but longer-lasting changes, such as
those induced by addiction or changes in one’s accustomed standard of living. Moreover, people
underappreciateboth endogenouschangesin preferencesthatdepend onprior choices, such asdrug
addiction, and exogenous changes in preferences that do not depend on prior choices, such those
associated with aging.
In Section 3, we develop a formal model of projection bias. To fix ideas, consider a person with
true period-￿ preferences ￿ES￿cr ￿￿,w h e r eS￿ is her consumption in period ￿ and r￿ is her state in
period ￿. Let the person’s prediction in period |￿￿of her period-￿ preferences be ￿ ￿ES￿cr ￿mr|￿,
where r| is her state in period |. Our reading of the evidence suggests that the person’s prediction
￿ ￿ES￿cr ￿mr|￿ lies somewhere ‘‘in between’’ her true period-￿ preferences ￿ES￿cr ￿￿ and her prefer-
ences given her current state ￿ES￿cr |￿. More precisely, we assume the person understands the qual-
itative nature of changes in her preferences — on all dimensions she correctly predicts in which
1direction her preferences will move — but she underestimates the magnitudes of these changes.
Formally, we assume that her predictions of the absolute utility from consumption, the marginal
utility from consumption, and all higher-order derivatives of the utility function lie in between the
true values and the values given her current state. To model dynamic choice given projection bias,




￿￿ ￿￿. Becauseprojection bias implies that predicted utilitiesneed not match actual utilities,
however, the person’s behavior need not correspond to correct intertemporal utility maximization.
Also in Section 3, we present two extended examples designed to illustrate the mechanics of
our model and to show its consistency with the evidence in Section 2. The first example examines
a person’s decision about what to eat in the future, where projection bias implies that the person’s
choice depends too much on her hunger level at the time she makes the decision. The second ex-
ample explores the relationship between projection bias and the endowment effect — the tendency
for people to value an object more highly if they possess it than if they do not. We show that pro-
jection bias explains evidence that people fail to predict the endowment effect, and moreover that
the endowment effect itself may in part be an error caused by projection bias.
In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we explore the behavioral and welfare implications of our model in a
range of economic contexts. In Section 4, we consider the implications of projection bias for a per-
son who cares not only about her current consumption but also about how her current consumption
compares to her past consumption. We show how projection bias, combined with such reference-
dependent utility, might lead to excessive consumption. We develop a simple two-period model in
which a person chooses both consumption and leisure each period, and assume that consumption
is more reference-dependent than leisure. Because the person underappreciates the extent to which
increasing her current consumption makes her worse off in the future, she over-consumes early in
life. Moreover, as time passes, the person will be surprised at how accustomed she has become
to high levels of consumption, and so will want to work harder than she had planned in order to
consume at a higher level than she had anticipated wanting to consume.
In Section 5, we consider the implications of projection bias for addiction. We consider an envi-
ronment in which consumption of an addictive product has two harmful long-term consequences:
It decreases aperson’sfuture well-being, and it increasestheperson’s futuredesirefor the addictive
product. Contrary to models that view addiction as rational self-medication (Becker and Murphy,
1988), or as the unlucky outcome of a gamble based on rational uncertainty about one’s own vul-
2nerability (Orphanides and Zervos, 1995), our model of projection bias predicts that people too
often become addicted because they underappreciate both of these deleterious effects of current
consumption. Our model also predicts that people tend to overreact to transitory changes in the
craving for addictive products caused by temporary factors such as a particularly stressful day at
work or being in a smoke-filled room. On days when cravings are high, the person overestimates
herfuturedesireforthedrug,which discourageseffortstoquit. Butondayswherecravingsarelow,
the person underestimates her future desire for the drug, and may engage in unrealistic attempts to
quit. Hence, while projection bias over the future deleterious effects of current consumption leads
a person to over-consume addictive products, projection bias over transient fluctuations in craving
may lead to over-frequent, but unsuccessful, attempts to quit in moments of low craving.
In Section 6, we explore the potential for welfare-improving policies suggested by our model.
In a variety of situations, people make difficult-to-reverse decisions when they are in a ‘‘hot’’ state
that is unlikely to persist — e.g., buying automobiles when the dealer has them excited, getting
married in the heat of passion, or committing suicide in the depth of depression. Because people
underappreciate the degree to which intense feelings will dissipate, they may be too likely to make
irreversible decisions. Imposing ‘‘cooling-off periods’’ — mandating that people delay for some
duration before making an irreversible decision — may help correct such errors. To illustrate the
potential benefits of cooling-off periods, we consider the purchase of a durable good when a dealer
can exert sales hype to get customers temporarily excited about a product. In this environment,
not only are people too likely to purchase the good, but also dealers who are aware that people
have projection bias exert excessive sales hype. We show that a cooling-off period can alleviate
both these problems, while (perhaps) imposing only a small cost on those trades that are in fact
beneficial.
We feel that psychological evidence provides strong support for the existence of projection bias,
and that our analysis in Sections 4, 5, and 6 highlights the potential economic importance of pro-
jection bias. We conclude in Section 7 by putting projection bias in broader economic context.
32. Evidence of Projection Bias
In this section we review a wide range of phenomena that exhibit the pattern which we refer to as
projectionbias.
1 Webegin by discussing evidence that peopleunderestimate theeffects of transient
fluctuationsin their tastes—by falselyprojecting their currenttransientpreferencesonto thefuture
— and then examine evidence that people underestimate long-term changes in tastes caused by
adaptation and other factors.
Several studies lend support to thefolk wisdom that shopping on an empty stomach leadspeople
tobuytoomuch. This phenomenoncan beinterpretedas amanifestationof projectionbias: People
who are hungry act as if their future taste for food will reflect such hunger. Nisbett and Kanouse
(1968) examined supermarket shoppers’ shopping lists, asked them when they had last eaten, and
then monitored their purchases. They found a positive correlation between over-shopping — buy-
ing more than what was on the shopping list — and hunger as measured by when the shopper last
ate.
2 Gilbert, Gill and Wilson (1998) conducted a similar study in which hunger was manipulated
by asking some shoppers to eat a muffin before they went shopping. Shoppers who ate muffins,
and were thus less hungry, purchased a lower proportion of items that weren’t on their shopping
lists (34%) than those who did not eat muffins (51%).
Read and van Leeuwen (1998)obtained furtherevidencethat peopleproject their current hunger
levels onto their future preferences. Office workers were asked to choose between healthy snacks
and unhealthy snacks that they would receive in oneweek, either at a time when they should expect
to behungry(latein theafternoon) orsatiated (immediately afterlunch). Subjectswereapproached
to make the choice either when they were hungry (late in the afternoon) or satiated (immediately
after lunch). As depicted in Table 1, people who expected to be hungry the next week were more
likely to opt for unhealthy snacks than those who expected to be satiated, presumably reflecting an
increased taste for unhealthy snacks in the hungry state. But in addition, people who were hungry
when they made the choice were more likely to opt for unhealthy snacks than those who were
4 See Loewenstein and Schkade (1999) for a summary of much of the evidence presented in this section, as well as
for a discussion of the psychological mechanisms that underlie projection bias.
5 This effect was only observed for non-obese shoppers. Obese shoppers displayed the reverse pattern.
4satiated, suggesting that people were projecting their current preferences onto their future selves.
3
Table 1: Percentage of Subjects Choosing Unhealthy Snack
(from Read and van Leeuwen (1998))
Future Hunger
Hungry Satiated
Current Hungry 78% 56%
Hunger Satiated 42% 26%
Loewenstein, Nagin and Paternoster (1997) provide evidence of projection bias with regard to
sexual arousal. Male undergraduates were randomly assigned to view sexually arousing or non-
arousing photographs. Subjects were then exposed to a vivid first-person date scenario in which
‘‘their date’’ suddenly requested a termination of physical intimacy. Subjects reported their likeli-
hood of behaving in a sexually aggressive fashion in this situation. Aroused subjects reported sub-
stantially higher likelihoods (70%) than nonaroused subjects (50%). That is, subjects’ perceptions
of their future preferences when sexually aroused depend on whether they are currently aroused.
4
A pervasive feature of preferences that shows up in a broad array of domains is loss aversion:
A person’s preferences are typically defined with respect to some reference level (e.g., the status
quo), where the person dislikes losses relative to the reference level significantly more than she
likes gains. One important manifestation of loss aversion is the endowment effect, which refers to
people’s tendency to value an object more highly if they possess it than if they do not.
5
Loewenstein andAdler(1995)demonstrateprojection biaswithregardtolossaversionbyshow-
ing thatpeopleunderestimatethemagnitude of theirown endowment effects. In onestudy, subjects
who were randomly assigned to a ‘‘prediction’’ treatment group were shown an embossed coffee
mug and then told that they would later be given one as a prize but would have the opportunity to
exchange it for cash. They were then shown the form that would be used to elicit their selling price
and were asked to complete it as they expected they would once they received the mug. After a
6 The healthy snacks were apples and bananas; theunhealthy snacks were crisps, borrelnoten, Mars Bars, and Snick-
ers Bars. Weadopttheterminologyhealthyand unhealthyfromtheexperimenters; whether theseterms areappropriate
is irrelevant to our point.
7 These results are consistent with projection bias only if the actual likelihood of behaving in a sexually aggressive
fashion is higher than 70%. Of course, the experimenters were unable to measure actual sexual behavior.
8 See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) for a review of the endowment effect. Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
show how the endowment effect arises naturally from assuming that people are loss-averse, and Strahilevitz and
Loewenstein (1998) provide further empirical studies supporting the loss aversion account of the endowment effect.
5delay, they were actually giventhe mug, andthen askedto complete the same form eliciting selling
prices. The other half of subjects were simply given mugs without first making predictions, and
thentheycompletedtheform elicitingselling prices. Theresults, presentedinTable 2, reveal a sys-
tematic underprediction of the impact of endowment on preferences: The predicted selling prices
of theprediction group were substantiallylower thanthe actual sellingprices of both theprediction
group and the non-prediction group.
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Table 2: Predicted and Actual Valuation of Mug
(from Loewenstein and Adler (1995))
Number of Prediction of Actual
Group Condition Subjects Valuation Valuation
Prediction 14 $3.73 $5.40
(0.41) (0.65)
Carnegie Mellon
University No Prediction 13 ——— $6.46
(0.54)
Prediction 22 $3.27 $4.56
(0.48) (0.59)
University of
Pittsburgh No Prediction 17 ——— $4.98
(0.53)
(standard errors in parentheses)
The above examples, in which people underappreciate the impact of transient fluctuations in
their tastes, are striking because they involve mispredictions of ‘‘changes’’ in tastes with which
people should be entirely familiar. Virtually all humans pass back and forth between states of
hunger and satiation on at least a daily basis, fluctuate between sexual arousal and non-arousal
with comparable frequency, and obtain and part with objects many times over the course of their
lives. Hence, even giving the rational-choice model all benefits of doubt, it is difficult to dismiss
these examples of projection bias as merely rational uncertainty about the consequences of future
9 While this study did not give participants an incentive to predict accurately, in a second study participants were
told that there was a 50% chance that they would receive a mug (based on a coin flip) and were given a form eliciting
selling prices that would apply if they did, in fact, obtain a mug. Selling prices were also elicited from other subjects
who were simply given a mug, and choice prices were elicited fromsubjects who were not endowed. Again, there was
a significant underprediction by non-endowed subjects of their own selling price once endowed.
6states.
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In turning to evidence of projection bias in predicting long-term changes in tastes, we concen-
trate on what is probably the most important category of projection bias: the underappreciation
of adaptation. There is a plethora of evidence that adaptation is a central component of human
well-being (see Helson (1964), and Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) for a recent review). This
literature consistently shows that people adapt to major changes in their life circumstances. But
there is also a great deal of evidence that people underestimate the extent to which they will adapt
to new circumstances, and hence overestimate the impact of major changes in circumstances on
their long-run level of happiness.
Becauseresearchonadaptationcannotbeconducted incontrolledlaboratorysettings, it isneces-
sarily less conclusive than research on underestimation of more short-term changes in tastes. Stud-
ies of adaptation almost always rely on comparisons of self-reported well-being across situations
(e.g., before and after suffering a calamity), which raises the possibility that measured adaptation
could result, in whole or in part, from changes in the way that people use the response scales (see
Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999, page 308). As a result, studies may exaggerate the degree of
‘‘true’’ adaptation, and therefore may also exaggerate the degree to which people underestimate
adaptation. In addition, studies of whether people predict adaptation often compare predictions for
onegroup of peopleto actual experiences for anothergroup of people, giving riseto selection prob-
lems. Despite these difficulties, however, we believe a number of studies do suggest that people
often underappreciate their own powers of adaptation.
In a classic study, Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) interviewed people who had
won lottery jackpot prizes within the last year (average winnings of $479,545) and a control group;
they found virtually no difference in reported happiness of lottery non-winners and winners. They
also found that lottery winners reported significantly less pleasure from each of six mundane daily
: Another subjective state with whose fluctuations most people should be very familiar is curiosity. Loewenstein,
Prelec and Shatto (1996) showed thatpeoplewho were in a non-curious state underpredicted theinfluence of curiosity
on their own behavior. In one study, subjects attempted to answer 5 geography questions, and were given a choice
between receiving the answers to the questions or getting an attractive candy bar. Subjects were first presented with
a sample of 5 different geography questions and their answers. Half the subjects were asked to choose between the
answers versusthecandybarbefore they attempted to answer the remaining 5 questions, while the other half attempted
to answer the remaining 5 questions, and only then were given a choice between the answers or candy bar. Those who
made the choice prior to attempting to answer the questions were significantly more likely to opt for the candy bar, as
if they underestimated the force of the curiosity they would experience, than those who chose after they had attempted
to answer the questions. (And a further study showed that subjects asked to predict beforehand their choice between
answers and candy once they attempted to answer the questions underestimated their own subsequent likelihood of
opting for the answers.)
7activities. Although the paper has no data on non-winners’ predictions of how they would feel if
they won, thenotion that lottery winnerswould beno happier than non-winners surely runs counter
to the predictions of most people — including, presumably, those playing the lottery.
Loewenstein and Frederick (1997) compared the predictions by survey respondents of how
changes in various environmental (e.g., decline in sport-fishing), social (e.g., increases in coffee
shops) and personal (e.g., increases in body weight or income) factors would affect their well-
being over the next decade to the reports of others about how actual changes in the last decade had
affectedtheirwell-being. Aclearpattern ofunderpredictionofadaptationemergedinthedata: Peo-
pleexpected future changes to affect their well-being much more than others believed that matched
changes in the past had affected their well-being.
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, and Wheatley (1997) report several instances of what they
label ‘‘immune neglect’’ — the tendency to underestimate one’s own powers of adaptation to un-
favorable events. For instance, assistant professors at the College of Liberal Arts at the University
of Texas, Austin who were asked to forecast their overall well-being at various points in time fol-
lowing their tenure decision — conditional on the decision being favorable and unfavorable —
predicted that their feelings about the decision would fully adapt in about 5 years after the decision,
while those who had been assistant professors during the previous ten years, who had received ei-
ther positiveor negativedecisions, reported actually adapting much morerapidly than that. That is,
academicsexaggeratedthelongevityofthehedonicimpactoftenure: Theywererelativelyaccurate
in predicting the immediate hedonic impact of getting or being denied tenure, but they extrapolated
these feelings further into the future than turned out to be warranted.
Sieff, Dawes, and Loewenstein (1999) asked people who came to a clinic for an HIV test to
complete a mood inventory as they thought they would complete it approximately five weeks after
obtaining the test result, conditional on whether the test indicated they were HIV-positive or HIV-
negative. Five weeks after receiving the test result they completed the same mood inventory. A
comparison of forecasts and subsequent reported feelings revealed that people overestimated both
how good they would feel after receiving a favorable result, and how bad they would feel after
receiving an unfavorable result.
8
Although thelargebodyofresearchonadaptationoverwhelminglysuggestsdramaticadaptation
; Becausetherewas alow rateofHIV-positiveresults amongtheoriginalsubjectpool, theresearchers alsorecruited,
using newspaper ads, a comparison group whohadreceived HIV-positive test results in the last 4-10 weeks. Given the
noncomparability of the groups, the results for the HIV-positive test results should be treated as tentative.
8to diverse circumstances, it presents a major paradox: If major changes in life-circumstances such
as winning the lottery or becoming paraplegic do not produce long-term changes in well-being,
then why do people exert significant amounts of effort to bring about or avoid these changes?
9
One possible explanation is that measures of well-being are flawed, as discussed earlier. Another
possibility is that people care a lot about the transition periods prior to adaptation — becoming
paraplegic is typically a horribleexperience, even if being paraplegicis not so bad in thelong-term.
But the fact that people seem to exert too much effort to obtain or avoid outcomes to which they
will adapt may befurther evidence of projection bias in this domain, becauseprojection bias would
cause peopletooverestimatethedurationof thetransitionperiods, andthereforetoexaggeratetheir
aggregate impact on utility.
3. The Model and Illustrations
In this section we formulate our general model, and present two extended examples designed to
illustrate the model’s mechanics and its consistency with the evidence inSection2. We assumethat







where ￿EU￿ct￿￿ is her instantaneous utility in period ￿, B ￿ ￿ is her discount factor, and A is her
(possibly infinite) time horizon. The vector U￿ is the person’s period-￿ consumption vector; U￿
includes all period-￿ behavior relevant for current or future instantaneous utilities. The vector t￿
is the person’s ‘‘state’’ in period ￿. Depending on the particular application, a person’s state could
be a single attribute or a vector of attributes. An individual state could be determined by past
consumption (e.g., a person’s addiction level), or by exogenous factors that might be internal (e.g.,
depression) or environmental (e.g., peer pressure). Importantly, a person cannot affect her current
state; indeed, our model essentially defines thestatetobe all factorsthat affect instantaneous utility
besides current consumption.
10 For analytic and notational simplicity, we assume no uncertainty in
this paper; this is highly artificial, but we suspect it does not affect our qualitative results.
< Oswald (1997) expresses this sentiment in a paper on happiness and economic performance: ‘‘How can it be...that
money buys so little well-being and yet we see individuals around us constantly striving to make more of it?’’
43 While we assume throughout the paper that the utility function itself is not a function of the date, the model could
be extended by treating calendar time as a state variable.
9Foranyperiod|andinitialstatet|, a‘‘fullyrational’’personwouldchooseapathofconsumption
EU|cU|n￿c￿￿￿cUA￿tomaximizetrueintertemporalutilityL|,takingintoaccounthowtheconsumption
path affects the evolution of future states. In our model, a person also attempts to maximize her
intertemporal utility, but she may fail to do so because she mispredicts her future instantaneous
utilities.
Formally, we assume that a person understands how her behavior affects the state variables, and
which exogenous factors affect her future utility, so that for any consumption plan EU|cU|n￿c￿￿￿￿ the
person can predict exactly the future state variables Et|n￿ct|n2c￿￿￿￿. It is the impact of future state
variables on her future utility that the person mispredicts.
11 Let ￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ denote the prediction
of a person currently in state t| of what her instantaneous utility would be from consuming U￿ in
state t￿ in period ￿:| .
12 For a fully rational person, predicted utility should equal true utility
—t h a ti s ,￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ’ ￿EU￿ct￿￿. But the evidence in Section 2 suggests that for many people
predicted utility is not equal to true utility. Rather, people tend to exhibit projection bias,w h i c h
roughly speaking means predicted utility ￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ lies ‘‘in between’’ true utility ￿EU￿ct￿￿ and
utility in the current state ￿EU￿ct|￿.
In defining a more precise notion of ‘‘in between,’’ we incorporate two features. First, the
person understands the qualitative nature of changes in her preferences, but underestimates the
magnitude of these changes. Second, the more the person’s future preferences differ from her
current preferences, the further her prediction is from her true future utility. To formalize these
features, we introduce some notation (much of which won’t be used beyond Definition 1 be-
low). Let t 5 Uu, and let r￿ denote its ￿
th element. We say t and t￿ differ only in element
￿ if r￿ 9’ r￿
￿ and r￿ ’ r￿
￿ for all ￿ 9’ ￿.L e t U 5 Ug, and let S￿ denote its ￿
th element. For
all ? 5 i￿c2c￿￿￿j,d e f i n e￿?
@￿@2￿￿￿@?EUct￿ ￿
Y?￿
YS@￿YS@2￿￿￿YS@?EUct￿,w h e r e@￿ 5 i￿c2c￿￿￿c&j;t h e s e
are all the ?|￿-order partial derivatives of the function ￿EUct￿ with respect to the consumption
variables. Define ￿ ￿?
@￿@2￿￿￿@?EUct￿ as the analogs of ￿?
@￿@2￿￿￿@?EUct￿ for predicted utility, and define
￿fEUct￿’￿EUct￿ and ￿ ￿fEUct￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EUct￿. We assume that ￿EUct￿ and h ￿EUct￿ are fully differen-
tiable, so that all these items are well-defined. Finally, for any two real numbers % and +, let the set
CE%c+￿ ￿ d4￿?i%c+jc4@ i%c+jo denote the interval between % and +￿
44 Ourmodelisessentiallyequivalenttoanalternativeformulationofprojectionbiaswhereinpeopleunderestimatethe
degree to which the states will change. While our modeling choice is irrelevant for the results, we feel our formulation
better reflects the underlying psychology.
45 We assume that predicted utility, like actual utility, does not depend on the dates involved.
10Definition 1. Predicted utility exhibits projection bias if
(1) For all U, t and t￿ such that t and t￿ differ only in element ￿ 5 i￿c￿￿￿cuj,a n df o ra l l








(2) For all U, t, t￿,a n dt￿￿ such that t, t￿,a n dt￿￿ differ in only element ￿ 5 i￿c￿￿￿cuj,

















value and the current value, the various marginal utilities and cross-partials of all orders are also in
between the true values and the current values. This condition implies that the person understands
the qualitative nature of changes in her preferences, but underestimates the magnitudes of these
changes. Condition 2 says that the more the person’s future preferences differ from her current
preferences, the further her predictions are from her true future utility. Again, the condition says
that not only is this true for the predicted absolute level of utility, but it is also true for the various
marginal utilities and cross-partials.
There is a particularly simple and intuitive form of projection bias that we shall often assume in
this paper:
Definition 2. Predicted utility exhibits simple projection bias if there exists k 5 dfc￿osuchthat for
all U, t,a n dt￿, ￿ ￿EUctmt￿￿ ’E ￿￿ k￿ ￿EUct￿nk￿ EUct￿￿.
If k ’f c the person predicts her future instantaneous utility correctly, and therefore has no
projection bias. If k:f, the person has projection bias satisfying Definition 1, where the bigger
is k the stronger is the bias. If k ’￿ , the person perceives that her preferences in the future will
be identical to her current preferences, independent of any changes in her state.
While we shall assume simple projection bias in several illustrations, other applications make
clear that it is far too restrictive for use as a general definition. Most problematically, simple pro-
jection bias requires that the magnitude of the bias be identical for different types of states. For
example, it requires that a person who is currently not thirsty and currently unaddicted to cocaine
bejust asbad atpredicting her preferenceswhen she is thirsty as sheisat predicting her preferences
when addicted to cocaine. We suspect that most non-addicts are better at imagining thirst than co-
11caine craving. Definition 1 allows for such realistic manifestations of projection bias, while still
imposing the general features of ‘‘betweenness.’’
If a person has projection bias, and her state in period | is t|, then she perceives her period-|







We assume that for any period | and initial state t|, a person with projection bias chooses a path
of consumption EU|cU|n￿c￿￿￿cUA￿ to maximize her perceived intertemporal utility ￿ L|, taking into
account how the consumption path affects the evolution of future states. That is, she behaves
exactly as a fully rational person would except that ￿ L| 9’ L|.
To help clarify the nature of our model, and to connect it to the evidence in Section 2, we now
present two extended examples that apply simple projection bias. We begin with a formalization of
how current hunger influences decisions about future food choice, inspired by and paralleling the
experiment by Read and van Leeuwen (1998) discussed in Section 2.
Suppose that a person can either be hungry or satiated, where state r| ’ M represents hunger
and r| ’ 7 represents satiation. Suppose that the person can eat either fruit or chips, where S| ’ 8






￿8M if S￿ ’ 8 and r￿ ’ M
￿87 if S￿ ’ 8 and r￿ ’ 7
￿￿M if S￿ ’ ￿ and r￿ ’ M
￿￿7 if S￿ ’ ￿ and r￿ ’ 7.
Supposethepersonmustchooseinperiod0whichsnacktoconsumeinperiod1. Inthissituation,
the person’s optimal behavior — what she would do if she were fully rational — is independent
of the current state. A person who anticipates being hungry next week should choose chips if and
onlyif ￿￿M￿￿8M : f, regardless of whether sheis currently hungry or satiated; and aperson who
anticipatesbeing satiatednextweek shouldchoosechipsifandonlyif ￿￿7￿￿87 : f,regardlessof
whether she is currently hungry or satiated. Since the Read and van Leeuwen experiment suggests
that people’s relative preference for chips is increasing in their hunger — people who expected to
be hungry were more likely to choose the unhealthy snack than people who expected to be satiated
— we shall proceed under the assumption ￿￿M ￿ ￿8M :￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿87.
A person with projection bias chooses chips if and only if ￿ ￿E￿cr￿mrf￿ ￿ : ￿ ￿E8cr￿mrf￿. For actual
12behavior, unlike optimal behavior, the person’s choice depends not only on her anticipated future
state, but also on her current state. Of course, projection bias matters only insofar as the person’s
future state will be different from her current state. Hence, if either rf ’ r￿ ’ M or rf ’ r￿ ’ 7,
the person behaves optimally. Suppose instead that the person is currently hungry but expects to
be satiated (i.e., rf ’ M and r￿ ’ 7), in which case she chooses chips if and only if ￿ ￿E￿c7 m
M￿ : ￿ ￿E8c7 m M￿. With a simple projection bias, ￿ ￿E￿c7 m M￿’E ￿￿ k￿￿￿7 n k￿￿M and
￿ ￿E8c7 m M￿’E ￿￿ k￿￿87 n k￿8M. Hence, the person chooses chips if and only if
￿￿7 ￿ ￿87 : ￿kdE￿￿M ￿ ￿8M￿ ￿ E￿￿7 ￿ ￿87￿o
or ￿￿M ￿ ￿8M : E￿ ￿ k￿d E￿￿M ￿ ￿8M￿ ￿ E￿￿7 ￿ ￿87￿o.
Under our assumption that ￿￿M ￿ ￿8M :￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿87, the first inequality above implies that
the person is too likely to choose chips; because she projects her current hungry preferences onto
her future satiated preferences, she over-estimates how much she’ll want chips. It is also worth
noting that the second inequality above implies that the person is less likely to choose chips than
she would be if she anticipated being hungry next week. In other words, a person with projection
bias does not ignore that her preferences are state-dependent — she recognizes that being satiated
willdiminishherpreferenceforchipsrelativetofruit—shemerelyunderappreciatesthemagnitude
of the change.
Analogous arguments hold for the case where the person is currently satiated but expects to be
hungry (i.e., rf ’ 7 and r￿ ’ M); the person recognizes that being hungry increases her relative
preferenceforchipsoverfruit, butsheunderappreciatesthemagnitudeofthiseffectand istherefore
too unlikely to choose chips. In sum, projection bias, combined with the assumption that hunger
increases a person’s relative preference for chips, yields conclusions that correspond to both the
behavior and the intuitions from Read and van Leeuwen (1998).
Our second example explores the relationship between projection bias and the endowment-
effect. Suppose a person can either own a mug, in which case her consumption is S| ’ ￿,o r
not own a mug, in which case her consumption is S| ’f . In addition, the person’s state can be
either the reference point of owning a mug, r| ’￿ , or the reference point of not owning a mug,
r| ’f . For simplicity, we shall assume that a person’s reference point depends on only whether
she enters period | owning a mug: If she enters period | owning a mug then r| ’￿ , and if she
13enters period | not owning a mug then r| ’f .
13 While we assume the state in period | depends on
whether the person enters period | owning a mug, we assume consumption in period | depends on
whether the person exits period | owning a mug.





> n C￿ E￿ ￿r|￿ if S| ’￿
￿u ￿ r| if S| ’f .
This formulation assumes that the person gets intrinsic value > from owning the mug in any
given period. But there is also a reference-dependent component to her utility function whenever
her mug status changes: If she has a mug (S| ’￿ ) when her reference level is not owning one
(r| ’f ), then she experiences a feeling of gain, C. If she does not own a mug (S| ’f )w h e nh e r
reference level is ownership (r| ’￿ ), then she experiences a feeling of loss, u.L o s sa v e r s i o n—
the tendency to dislike losses more than liking gains — implies u:C .
Endowment-effect experiments typically compare two situations: (1) A person not endowed
with a mug has the option to buy one, and (2) A person endowed with a mug has the option to
sell it. The endowment effect is reflected in the finding that the selling price in situation (2) is
significantly larger than the buying prices in situation (1).
14 To formalize the typical experiment in
terms of our model, we suppose that buying and selling decisions occur in period 1, after which
there is a second period during which the mug, if possessed, can yield benefits.
15 If the person’s
decision is to possess the mug, then S￿ ’ S2 ’ ￿; if the person’s decision is to not possess the
mug, then S￿ ’ S2 ’f . Both buyers and sellers must choose between these two consumption
flows, but buyers enter period 1 with r￿ ’fand sellers enter period 1 with r￿ ’￿ . We assume no
discounting and that the buying price ￿￿ or selling price ￿7 enters as a separable and linear part of
the intertemporal utility function — i.e., L￿ ’ ￿ES￿cr ￿￿n￿ES2cr 2￿ ￿ ￿￿
46 A more general formulation is vw @+ 4￿ ￿,vw￿4 . ￿fw￿4 for some ￿ 5 +3>4‘, where ￿ captures the speed of
adaptation. This formulation of changing reference points used in Ryder and Heal (1973), Bowman, Minehart, and
Rabin (1999), and Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998). Our example here is the case￿ @4 , butthequalitative results
hold for any ￿ 5 +3>4‘.
47 Many of the experiments actually compare selling prices to ‘‘choosing’’ prices — the amount of money a person
unendowed with a mug reveals she would accept in lieu of a mug. This experimental procedure in fact corresponds
more closely to our formal model. Moreover, because the money side of the transaction is identical for choosing and
selling, it both allows one to ignore the legitimate concern over the role of loss aversion over money and the rather
silly (but sometimes raised) concern that these experimental results might have something to do with wealth effects.
48 Our qualitative results crucially depend on there being at least one additional period in which the mug yields ben-
efits, since it is the period-2 benefits (or forgone benefits) which the person mispredicts. But whether there is one
additional period or many additional periods is not so important for our results.
14Let ￿W
￿ and ￿W
7 represent the optimal buying and selling prices, and let ￿￿
￿ and ￿￿
7 represent
the actual buying and selling prices for a person who has simple projection bias. A person who
enters period 1 without a mug and has the option to buy one should buy the mug if and only if
￿ ￿ 2> n C ￿ ￿ W
￿, because her true intertemporal utility is:
If Buy: x+4>3, . x+4>4, ￿ S @ ￿. J . ￿ ￿ S @5 ￿ .J ￿S
If Not: x+3>3, . x+3>3 , @3. 3 @ 3 .
If the person has simple projection bias of degree k, she actually buys the mug if and only if
￿ ￿ 2> n C n kC ￿ ￿￿
￿, because she perceives her intertemporal utility to be:
If Buy: ￿ ￿E￿cfmf￿ n ￿ ￿E￿c￿mf￿ ￿ ￿ ’ > n C n > n kC ￿ ￿ ’2 > n Cn kC ￿ ￿
If Not: ￿ ￿Efcfmf￿ n ￿ ￿Efcfmf￿ ’ f n f ’ f.
A person who enters period 1 with a mug and has the option to sell it should sell the mug if and
only if ￿ ￿ 2> n u ￿ ￿W
7, because her true intertemporal utility is:
If Keep: x+4>4, . x+4>4, @ ￿ . ￿ @5 ￿
If Sell: x+3>4, . x+3>3, . S @ ￿O .3.S @ ￿O .S.
If the person has simple projection bias of degree k, she actually sells the mug if and only if ￿ ￿
2> n u n ku ￿ ￿￿
7 , because she perceives her intertemporal utility to be:
If Keep: ￿ ￿E￿c￿m￿￿ n ￿ ￿E￿c￿m￿￿ ’ > n > ’2 >
If Sell: ￿ ￿Efc￿m￿￿ n ￿ ￿Efcfm￿￿ n ￿ ’ ￿u n ￿ku n ￿ ’ ￿u ￿ ku n ￿.









7. Projection bias leads both a potential buyer and a potential seller
to over-value the mug. A potential buyer overestimates the pleasure she’ll get from an object be-
cause she believes that she will continue to feel the pleasures of gain further into the future than
she actually will. A potential seller overestimates the pain she’ll feel from parting with an object
because she believes that she will continue to feel the pain of loss further into the future than she
actually will. These results are simple examples of what is probably the main class of phenomena
caused by projection bias: People have a tendency to over-consume reference-dependent goods.
15This over-consumption stems from an underappreciation of the temporary nature of both the plea-
sure they receive from gains relative to their reference point and the pain they feel from losses
relative to their reference point. Indeed, this theme underlies many of the examples in Section 2






Whether the person is fully rational or suffers from projection bias, she demands more to give up
an object than she is willing to pay to get it — that is, she exhibits the endowment effect. Given
our assumption that people exhibit loss aversion, the endowment effect is fully rational (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1991). Because a person with projection bias understands the qualitative nature of
her preferences, she exhibits the same qualitative behavior.





￿. While the person exaggerates the duration of both the sensation of loss after parting
with the mug and the sensation of gain after obtaining the mug, because losses loom larger than
gains, the exaggeration of losses has a greater impact. Hence, the endowment effect itself may in
part be an error caused by projection bias. In other words, although the endowment effect, and
loss aversion more generally, may be a manifestation of real preferences, people’s behavior may
be an exaggerated response to these real preferences. Insofar as people behave as if the unpleasant
sensations of loss will persist for a long time, they are making an error.
16
While the results above establish both the welfare implications of projection bias and the mag-
nitude of its effects in buying and selling decisions, these results don’t directly yield qualitative
behavioral predictions about how projection bias differs in this context from rational behavior. The
experiment by Loewenstein and Adler (1995) described in Section 2 identified onesuch difference:
49 Indeed, Kahneman (1991, p. 143) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) argue that the endowment effect is a bias
because people’s actual pain when losing an object is not commensurate with their unwillingness to part with that
object. Evidence from Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) also suggests this interpretation. Some subjects were
endowed with mugs for several minutes, but then (under the pretext of randomization) forced to pair up with a subject
who did not receive a mug and flip a coin to determine who would get to keep the mug. Shortly after this exchange of
mugs, selling prices were elicited from subjects with mugs, and choice prices were elicited from those without mugs,
creating prices for four groups of subjects:
(1). Began and ended with a mug: Selling Price = $5.26
(2). Began with a mug and lost it: Choice Price = $3.36
(3). Began without a mug and got one: Selling Price = $4.32
(4). Began and ended without a mug: Choice Price = $2.75
The average choice price of Group 2 subjects was higher than Group 4 subjects, showing that some of the sense of
loss persists after departing with an object. But the selling price of Group 1 was higher than the choice price of Group
2, showing that subjects adapt to the loss, at least to some degree, almost immediately following the loss of the mug.
The speed of adaptation suggested by this experiment seems inconsistentwith the magnitudes of theendowmenteffect
usually observed.
16When subjects not endowed with mugs were asked to predict their selling prices once they owned
the mug, they underestimated their selling price. Our model captures this phenomenon as well.
Suppose that a person will be given a mug in period 0 that would yield benefits for periods 1
and 2, but has the opportunity to sell it in period 1. Before the person is given the mug, however,
she is asked to predict what her selling price will be in period 1. That is, the person formulates in
state rf ’ f a prediction about her selling price when r￿ ’￿ .
Let ￿ ￿W
7 representthepredictedsellingpriceforapersonwhoisfullyrational,andlet ￿ ￿ ￿
7 represent
thepredictedsellingpriceforapersonwhohasprojectionbias. Becauseapersonwithoutprojection
bias perceives in period 0 her true period-1 intertemporal utility, clearly ￿ ￿W
7 ’ ￿W
7. In contrast, if
a person has simple projection bias k, she predicts that she will sell the mug if and only if ￿ ￿
2> nE ￿￿ k￿u n2 kC ￿ ￿ ￿￿
7 , because she perceives her intertemporal utility to be:
If Keep: ￿ ￿E￿c￿mf￿ n ￿ ￿E￿c￿mf￿ ’ > n kC n > n kC
If Sell: ￿ ￿Efc￿mf￿ n ￿ ￿Efcfmf￿ n ￿ ’E ￿ ￿ k￿E￿u￿ nfn ￿.
It is straightforward to see that ￿ ￿ ￿
7 ￿￿ ￿
7 ; a person with projection bias underestimates her
selling price. This result reflects the net effect of two countervailing biases. First, projection bias
causes the individual to overestimate the persistence of the feeling of gain from keeping the mug.
By itself, this error would cause her to overestimate her selling price. But this error is eclipsed
by a second, and bigger error: She underestimates the amount of loss she will feel in giving up
the mug. Hence, our model is consistent with the findings of Loewenstein and Adler (1995) that
people underestimate the degree to which they will become attached to objects.
The two examples above illustrate the crucial role that ‘‘states’’ play in our analysis; however,
our formal model does not put any restrictions on how states are defined. This is an important
limitation of the model, as the implications of projection bias can differ depending on which of two
specifications of preferences are employed, even when rational utility theory deems these specifi-
cations to be equivalent. For instance, suppose a person’s desire to smoke is influenced by both
peer pressure and the amount of smoke in the room. Our model does not ap r i o r ispecify whether
the two factors should be included as individual states, or whether the two factors should be com-
bined into asingle state, or even whether thereshould be two states, each of which depends on both
factors (e.g., the ‘‘sum’’ and the ‘‘difference’’).
In conventional economic theory the choice of what to designate as a state in the definition of
the utility function is merely a semantic point, but because projection bias is pinned to particular
17states, in our model such designations matter a great deal. The only ‘‘psychology-free’’ way to
define states in a way that fully pins down projection bias is to allow only one state; however, this
is too restrictive. Returning to the example above, if we want to allow a person to underappreciate
theeffects of peer pressure to a different degree than sheunderappreciates the effects of the amount
of smoke in the room, we must define each factor to be an individual state. Hence, the starting
point for each of our applications is to propose adomain in which a person might exhibit projection
bias, and to specify assumptions about what are the natural ‘‘states’’ to consider. The psychology
of the particular application, therefore, determines the relevant states in what we hope and believe
is a non-arbitrary and non-post hoc way. Again returning to our example above, choosing to label
environmental smoke and peer pressure as the two states rather than the sum and the difference
between the two factors is an assumption that we suspect readers can intuit as being appropriate.
Theendowment-effectexamplealsoillustrateshowprojectionbiascanleadtodynamicinconsis-
tency —planningto behaveacertain wayin thefuture, butlater, intheabsenceofnewinformation,
revising this plan. Formally, a person is dynamically inconsistent if EU|cU|n￿c￿￿￿cUA￿ maximizes ￿ L|
and yet after following EU|cU|n￿c￿￿￿cU￿3￿￿, EU￿cU￿n￿c￿￿￿cUA￿ does not maximize ￿ L￿. Dynamic in-
consistency can arise because perceived preferences may be time-inconsistent: Even though the
person’s true intertemporal preferences are time-consistent, projection bias implies that the per-
son’s perceived period-￿ intertemporal utility may turn out to be different from that predicted in
period |.
In models of self-control problems of the sort we discuss in the conclusion, a person’s true
preferences are time-inconsistent, and it therefore makes sense to assume that the person is aware
of, but disapproves of, her own futurepreferences. In ourmodel, incontrast, thetimeinconsistency
inperceivedpreferencesderives solelyfrom mispredictionof futureutilities,soit wouldmakelittle
sense to assume that the person is completely aware of this inconsistency. We assume throughout
the paper that the person is unaware of the time inconsistency — that is, at all times the person
perceives her preferences to be time-consistent.
17
Of course, a person need not be dynamically inconsistent even when she does not anticipate
4: Given the logic of our model, it is inherent that a person is unaware of her current misprediction; but the person
could have an awareness of her future propensity to mispredict. A person could, for instance, be aware of her general
propensity toover-shop when hungry, while still committing theerror ona case-by-casebasis. Thecoexistence ofday-
to-day mispredictions with a ‘‘meta-awareness’’ of these mispredictions is similar to the discussion in O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999b) of how people can simultaneously be aware of their general tendency to procrastinate and yet
still procrastinate on a case-by-case basis. A model of ‘‘sophisticated projection bias’’ could plausibly better describe
behavior in some circumstances, but we choose our current formulation as a simpler starting point.
18changes in her preferences. Proposition 3.1, in fact, provides sufficient conditions for dynamic
consistency despite projection bias:




￿ct￿￿,a n df o ra l lU￿, t￿, t￿
￿, t|,a n dt￿
|, ￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿￿￿ ￿EU￿ct￿
￿mt|￿ ’
￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt￿
|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿ct￿
￿mt￿
|￿.
Proposition 3.1 says that as long as projection bias does not cause a person either to misper-
ceive the relative merits of any two consumption bundles, or to misperceive the relative impact on
preferences of any two future states, then the person is dynamically consistent.
18 Though certain
themes will be repeated throughout the remainder of the paper, beyond Proposition 3.1 we reach
no general formal conclusions about the implications of projection bias. Instead, we turn now to
three extended applications of our model.
19
4. Over-Consumption
In this section we explore how projection bias combined with reference-dependent utility might
lead to excessive pursuit of a high material standard of living.
20 We consider a simple model of
consumption-leisure decisions. In period ￿, a person chooses consumption, S￿, and leisure, ,￿; that
is, the vector of choice variables is ES￿c, ￿￿. In principle, both consumption and leisure could be
reference-dependent. But since realistically, we believe, consumption is more reference-dependent
than leisure, we shall assume for simplicity that leisure is not reference-dependent.
21 Let oS
￿ denote
the reference level for consumption in period ￿ — that is, the state variable is r￿ ’ oS
￿. We assume
the instantaneous utility function takes the following form:
4; The second condition necessarily holds for a simple projection bias.
4< Each of our applications employs a simple model that abstracts away from some of the richer features of the re-
spective environments. The introduction of richer features would have similar qualitative effects in our model as in a
rational-choice model, although our model allows that people might over- or under-react to such features relative to
what is optimal.
53 Many models over the years posit habit persistencein consumption of thesort weconsider here. See, e.g., Duesen-
berry (1952), Ryder and Heal (1973), and Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999).
54 Our main points in this section depend on merely consumption being more reference-dependent than leisure, and
noton leisurebeing reference-independent. Ingeneral, the degreeof referencedependencefora good depends on both
how much the person cares about deviations from her reference level and how quickly the person’s reference level
adjusts. Frank (1999, Chapter 6) provides diverse support for the assumption that leisure is less reference-dependent
than consumption.
19￿EES￿c, ￿￿cr ￿￿’￿ES￿￿n￿E,￿￿n-ES￿ ￿ o
S
￿￿.
The functions ￿ES￿￿ and ￿E,￿￿ are the direct utilities from consumption and leisure, where we
assume ￿￿c￿￿ : f and ￿￿￿c￿ ￿￿ ￿ f.
22 -ES￿ ￿oS
￿￿ is the reference-dependent utility from consump-
tion, which captures how a person cares about gains and losses relative to the reference point. We
assume that - is strictly increasing and weakly concave: -￿ : f and -￿￿ ￿ f.
23
We suppose that the reference level for consumption evolves according to
o
S
￿ ’ E￿ ￿ ￿￿o
S
￿3￿ n ￿S￿3￿.
The parameter ￿ represents how quickly the person adapts to changes in consumption. If ￿ ’ ￿,
then each period’s reference level is equal to the prior period’s choice, meaning that the person
adapts very quickly to changes. If ￿ ’f , in contrast, then the person’s reference level never
changes, and consumption is effectively reference-independent.
Forsimplicity, weconsideratwo-periodmodelwherethereisno discounting,and thepersoncan
borrow or saveat 0% interest.
24 Wenormalize units of timeand income such that in each period the
person is endowed with one unit of time to divide between labor and leisure, and each unit of time
allocated to labor yields one unit of consumption purchasing power. Hence, the person’s budget
constraint is
25
^f￿ . f2‘.^ o￿ .o2‘ ￿ 5.
Finally, we assume that the initial reference point is oS





55 Our assumption that the utility from consumption and leisure are separable is of course potentially restrictive,
since the utility of spending on consumption is likely to depend on how much leisure time a person has to enjoy that
consumption. We assume separability for convenience, but do not know how relaxing it would change results.
56 Basedonbehavioralevidence, KahnemanandTversky(1979)proposeaspartoftheirprospecttheorythatU33+{, ?
3 for {A3 while U33+{, A 3 for {?3, which implies people have a decreasing sensitivity to both losses and gains.
We focus on the case where only gains are relevant — because we assume the initial reference point is small and there
is no uncertainty — so it does not matter that we assume global concavity. Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999)
consider a rational-choice model of reference-dependent consumption where income is uncertain and therefore people
might experience losses. They assume diminishing sensitivity to losses, and show that it implies people are prone to
resist an immediate reduction in consumption in response to unexpected decreases in income. Since their results are
strongest when a person believes that future reference levels of consumption will adjust slowly, projection bias would
likely enhance their results.
57 Our main results hold even if the person cannot borrow or save.
58 Technically, the budget constraint also requires f4>f 5>o 4>o 5 ￿ 3 and o4>o 5 ￿ 4. Our analysis here assumes an
interior solution.
20behavior, which is derived from the following choice problem:
4@ ES￿cS2c,￿c,2￿ L￿ ’ d￿ES￿￿n￿E,￿￿n-ES￿￿o
nd ￿ES2￿n￿E,2￿n-ES2 ￿ ￿S￿￿o
such that S￿ n S2 n ,￿ n ,2 ￿ 2.






Lemma 4.1 states that the person should increase her consumption over time, while working
the same amount each period. Since there is no discounting, if consumption were not reference-
dependent, then the person would consume the same amount each period. But since the person
will become accustomed to her consumption level, the more she consumes now, the less she will
enjoy future consumption. As a result, it is optimal to have a consumption stream that increases
over time. Since leisure is not reference-dependent, it should be the same each period.




2 ￿ denote the
person’s actual behavior, and let E￿ S￿
2 c￿ ,￿
2 ￿ denote the person’s plan in period 1 for period-2 behavior.
In period 1, the person chooses S￿
￿ , ,￿
￿ , ￿ S￿
2 ,a n d￿ ,￿
2 to solve the following problem:
4@ ES￿cS2c,￿c,2￿ ￿ L￿ ’ d￿ES￿￿n￿E,￿￿n-ES￿￿o
nE ￿ ￿ k￿d￿ES2￿n￿E,2￿n-ES2 ￿ ￿S￿￿o
n kd￿ES2￿n￿E,2￿n-ES2￿o
such that S￿ n S2 n ,￿ n ,2 ￿ 2.
Whereas in period 1 the person chooses her planned period-2 behavior, she chooses her actual
period-2 behavior in period 2, after S￿
￿ and ,￿
￿ have been chosen and carried out. Hence, S￿
2 and ,￿
2
solve the following problem:
















21How do actual and planned behavior compare to optimal behavior? Because the person un-
derstands the qualitative nature of her preferences, her planned behavior has the same qualitative
features as her optimal behavior — that is, the person plans to increase her consumption over time,
while planning to work the same amount each period.
Lemma 4.2. S￿
￿ ￿ ￿ S￿
2 and ,￿
￿ ’ ￿ ,￿
2 .
Although the person plans to increase her consumption over time, as is optimal, she may do so
in a suboptimal way. To distinguish the different errors that the person might make, we separate the
cases where the reference function -E￿￿ is linear from those where it is strictly concave.











2 ’ ￿ S￿
2 and ,￿
2 ’ ￿ ,￿
2 .
Part 1 of Proposition 4.1 establishes that the person over-consumes in period 1, and over-works
in both periods to pay for this over-consumption. Intuitively, projection bias leads the person to
underappreciate how much she will become accustomed to high consumption, and therefore to
underestimate how much increasing her current consumption will reduce her future well-being. As
aresult, theperson over-indulgesintheconsumption activity.
26 Part2 statesthatwhen thereference
function is linear, the person behaves in period 2 exactly as she planned to behave — that is, she is
dynamically consistent. When the reference function is linear, the reference point affects only the
person’s absolute utility, and not her marginal utility of consumption. Hence, the utility function
satisfies the conditions for Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 4.1 illustrates how projection bias leads a person to over-consume while young,
because she underappreciates how much she will become accustomed to her consumption level.
By assuming the reference function -E￿￿ is linear, however, it does not capture a second effect of
59 The extension of this logic to more than two periods says that in all periods except the last, actual consumption is
larger thanoptimal conditionalon past consumption.T h a ti s ,i naW-period model, actual consumption in period w?W






22projection bias in this environment: dynamic inconsistency. Proposition 4.2 shows what happens
when - is strictly concave, so that a person exhibits decreasing sensitivity to gains relative to her
reference point:





2 : ￿ S￿
2 and ,￿
2 ￿ ￿ ,￿
2 .
Part 1 of Proposition 4.2 establishes that, just as with a linear reference function and for the
same reason, the person over-consumes in period 1 when the reference function is strictly concave.
Unlike when the reference function is linear, however, over-consumption in period 1 need not be





2, as in the linear case, but it could also be that ,￿
￿ ’ ￿ ,￿
2 ￿ ,W
￿ ’ ,W
2. The person might
under-work when - is strictly concave because in addition to overestimating the marginal utility
of current consumption, the person also underestimates the marginal utility of future consumption,
and therefore may pay for excess current consumption by planning to forego future consumption
rather than current and future leisure.
27
Part2establishesthattheconcavityof-introducesadynamic-inconsistencyeffectthatisabsent
when - is linear. When period 2 arrives, the person discovers the full effects of having a larger
reference point. When - is linear, this unfortunate discovery does not affect the person’s desire to
consume. But when- isconcave, thepersondiscovers that themarginal utilityofconsumptionhas
increased. Hence, she decides to ‘‘ramp up’’ her consumption, which in turn requires that she work
more than she had planned. Indeed, if there were more periods, this process would continually
repeat itself: Each period the person will be surprised at how accustomed she has become to her
consumption level, and as a result she will revise upward her planned consumption and therefore
revise downward her planned leisure.
Hence, our analysis shows that under the plausible assumption that consumption is more highly
reference-dependent than leisure, peoplewith projection bias tend to over-consume, whileworking
more than they should and than they expected to support this consumption. This analysis indeed
5: E.g., if ￿ @4and ￿ @4 , one can show that oD
4 @ a oD
5 ?o ￿
4 @ o￿
5 for y+{,@U+{,@5 {4@5 whereas oD





23parallels the arguments of many previous researchers, such as Scitovsky (1976) and Frank (1999),
who have argued that people spend too much time and energy generating wealth and too little time
on leisure activities, and that people enjoy increases in their standard of living less than they think
they will.
5. Addiction
An important domain in which state-dependent preferences play aroleis theconsumption of harm-
ful addictiveproducts. As with all products, thetemptation to consume addictiveproducts can vary
over time due to factors such as age, environmental cues, traumatic events, peer pressure, and so
forth. But the very essence of harmful addictive products is that a person’s preferences depend
on her own past behavior. In this section, we explore the implications of projection bias for the
consumption of harmful addictive products.
28
We consider a simple model of addiction with two periods, | 5 i￿c2j, and in each period a
person can either ‘‘hit’’ (choose S| ’￿ ) or ‘‘refrain’’ (choose S| ’f ). Our results generalize to
a multi-period model, but the arguments are more complicated. We also simplify the model by
assuming that the addictive product is free, so that the decision to hit is based solely on whether the
current benefits of hitting outweigh the perceived long-run costs.
There aretwo ways in which past consumption of a harmful addictive product can affect current
preferences. First, addictive products involve negative internalities: Past consumption decreases
a person’s current level of utility.
29 Negative internalities capture the adverse effects of harmful
addictive products on a person’s day-to-day life, including health problems, decreased job perfor-
5; Basedonearlierreasearchonhabitformation(e.g., Pollak(1970)), BeckerandMurphy(1988)formulateamodelof
instantaneous utilities for addictive products, and characterize steady-state levels of addiction at which aperson would
rationally not be motivated to become unaddicted. Using a similar model of instantaneous utilities, Orphanides and
Zervos(1995)explorewhetherapersonmightrationallychoosetobecomeaddictedwhensheisuncertainabouttheef-
fects of addiction. Although Orphanides and Zervos allow only fully rational agents in their formal model, they in fact
discuss thepossibility that theremay be a systematic propensity for peopleto underestimate the addictiveness of prod-
ucts. This posited departure from rational-choice theory is similar to our formal model where people underappreciate
addictiveness. In this section, we study a variant of the model developed by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999c, 1999d),
who modify and simplify the Becker-Murphy model of instantaneous utilities to explore the role of self-control prob-
lems for addictive behavior. The model is also closely related to Loewenstein’s (1999) ‘‘visceral account of addiction’’
which incorporates a specific kind of projection bias that he labels a ‘‘cold/hot intrapersonal empathy gap.’’ His pa-
per also presents diverse evidence from the literature on drug addiction supporting the assumptions we make in this
section.
5< We borrow the term ‘‘internalities’’ from Herrnstein et al. (1993), who define an internality to be a ‘‘within-person
externality’’.
24mance, strained personal relationships, and so forth. ‘‘Tolerance’’ for an addictive product — the
need to consumeincreasing amounts to obtain thesameeffect — also fallsundertherubricofnega-
tive internalities. Second, addictive products involve habit formation: Past consumption increases
a person’s current marginal utility for theproduct, which meansthat her ‘‘craving’’ for the addictive
product will be stronger the more she has consumed in thepast. The combination of negative inter-
nalities and habit formation creates the trap of addiction: As a person consumes more and more of
an addictive product, she receives less and less pleasure from this consumption, and yet she finds
it more and more difficult to refrain.
Toincorporatetheeffectsofnegativeinternalitiesandhabitformation,wesupposethatalleffects
of past consumption can be incorporated into a single statistic, &|, which we shall refer to as a
person’s addiction level in period |. In our two-period model, we assume that &￿ ￿ f is exogenous
(i.e., &￿ reflects consumption prior to period 1), and that &2 ’ ￿&￿ n S￿ for some ￿ 5 dfc￿￿.
30 In
additiontopastconsumption,instantaneousutilityinperiod|candependonexogenousfactorssuch
as fluctuations in environmental cues, peer pressure, etc. We let %￿ and %2 denote the exogenously
determined component of the instantaneous utility from hitting in periods 1 and 2, respectively. To
fit within the frameworkof thispaper, we shall treat%￿ and %2 as deterministic, although the results
easily generalize to the case where they are stochastic.
The person’s instantaneous utility function depends on current consumption S| and the current





%| ￿ 4&| if S| ’ ￿
￿E4 n j￿&| if S| ’f .
In this formulation, the parameter 4:f represents the negative internalities. Whether or not
a person chooses to hit in period |, her instantaneous utility is reduced by amount 4&|,r e f l e c t i n g
that past consumption has reduced her current well-being. The parameter j:f represents habit
formation. A person’s desire to consume in period | is ￿E￿ct|￿ ￿ ￿Efct|￿’%| n j&|. Hence, the
more a person has consumed in the past, the bigger is &|, and therefore the larger is the current
desire to consume. The current desire to consume also depends on exogenous factors as captured
63 We assume n4 ￿ 4@+4 ￿ ￿,, which guarantees that hitting in period 1 makes the person more addicted in period




Of course, a person hits in period | only if the current desire to consume is larger than the per-
ceived future cost of this consumption, which depends on projection bias. In this model, there
are three dimensions along which a person’s preferences are state-dependent — negative internali-
ties, habit formation, and exogenous factors — and projection bias could operate differently along
these three dimensions. Indeed, the different implications of projection bias along these different
dimensions is the focus of our analysis. We use the following formulation of projection bias:




dE￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿o ￿ 4dE￿ ￿ k4￿&2 n k4&￿o if S2 ’￿
￿ 4dE￿ ￿ k4￿&2 n k4&￿o ￿ jdE￿ ￿ kj￿&2 n kj&￿o if S2 ’f .
In this formulation, k4 represents how much a person underappreciates the effects of negative in-
ternalities, kj represents how much a person underappreciates the effects of habit formation, and
k% represents how much a person underappreciates the effects of exogenous factors.
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the person’s actual consumption in periods 1 and 2. We shall also be interested in how a person
would behave in period 2 as a function of her period-1 behavior. Let ￿W
2ES￿￿ be optimal behavior in
period 2 conditional on period-1 behavior, let ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ be actual behavior in period 2 conditional on
period-1 behavior, and let ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ be perceived optimal behavior in period 2 conditional on period-






￿ ￿; but it need not be the case that S￿
2 ’ ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿
￿ ￿
because the person might be dynamically inconsistent.
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Because period 2 is the last period, the person hits in period 2 if and only if the temptation to hit
is non-negative.
34 Moreover, habit formation implies the temptation to consume in period 2 will be
larger if the person hits in period 1 than if she refrains in period 1. Because this intuition holds for
both the person’s true future preferences or her perceived future preferences, a fully rational person
is more likely to hit in period 2 if she hits in period 1, and a person with projection bias perceives
64 Ourassumptionthatexogenousfactorsinfluencetheutilityofhittingratherthantheutilityfromrefrainingispurely
for notational convenience — the two assumptions are formally equivalent.
65 Note that this formulation does not fall under the rubric of simple projection bias, and our analysis in this section




on herbehavior in period 1 (which maynothave been optimal). In amulti-period model, thisisalways trueinthefinal
period, but need not be true in any other period since, as with period 1 in this model, a person’s behavior depends on
her perceived future preferences.
67 For simplicity, we assume throughout that a person hits when indifferent.
26herself as more likely to hit in period 2 if she hits in period 1. This logic is summarized in Lemma
5.1.





2 E￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef￿.
In period 1, the person cares about the current temptation to hit, but also cares about the cost to
future well-being from hitting now. For optimal behavior, this trade-off takes the following form:
It is optimal to hit in period 1 (i.e., SW
￿ ’￿ )i fa n do n l yi f
￿E￿cE&￿c% ￿￿￿ ￿￿EfcE&￿c% ￿￿￿ ￿ Bd￿E￿
W
2Ef￿cE￿&￿c% 2￿￿ ￿ ￿E￿
W
2E￿￿cE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿￿o
or
%￿ n j&￿ ￿ Bd￿E￿
W
2Ef￿cE￿&￿c% 2￿￿ ￿ ￿E￿
W
2E￿￿cE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿￿o.
For optimal behavior, the temptation to hit in period 1 is %￿ nj&￿. The future cost of hitting is the
person’s period-2 utility following restraint in period 1, which is ￿E￿W
2Ef￿cE￿&￿c% 2￿￿, minus her
period-2 utility following hitting in period 1, which is ￿E￿W
2E￿￿cE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿￿.
For a person suffering from projection bias, the perceived trade-off of current temptation vs.
future cost takes a similar form: The person hits in period 1 if and only if









































For actual behavior, the temptation to consume in period 1 is %￿nj&￿, which is of course identical
to that for optimal behavior — projection bias does not affect current instantaneous utilities. The
perceived future cost of hitting is her perceived period-2 utility following restraint in period 1,








, minus her perceived period-2 utility following hitting in
period 1, which is ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿￿






27Projection bias can cause the person to mispredict the future cost of hitting in two ways. First,
thereisadirecteffect: projectionbiascausesthepersontoperceiveincorrectperiod-2instantaneous
utilities (i.e., ￿ ￿differs from ￿). Second, there is an indirect effect: projection biascauses theperson
to mispredict her own future behavior (i.e., ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ possibly differs from ￿W
2ES￿￿).
It is straightforward to show that optimal and actual period-1 behavior both take the form of
a ‘‘cutoff rule,’’ where the person hits if and only if her current addiction level is above some
threshold:
Lemma 5.2. For all jc4 : f, ￿ 5 dfc￿o, %￿c% 2 5 U,a n dk4ck jck % 5 dfc￿o:
(1) There exists 7 &W ￿ f such that SW
￿ ’ ￿ if and only if &￿ ￿ 7 &W,a n d
(2) There exists 7 &￿ ￿ f such that S￿
￿ ’ ￿ i fa n do n l yi f&￿ ￿ 7 &￿.
The keyresult behindLemma 5.2 isthat the futurecost of hittingis decreasingin &￿ —th em o re
addicted a person currently is, the less a current hit will hurt her in the future. This feature of our
model is true both for the actual future cost of hitting and for the perceived future cost of hitting.
Sincethetemptationtohit isincreasinginheraddictionlevel, clearlythepersonwill followacutoff
rule.
WhileLemmas 5.1and 5.2pertain to anycombinationof k4, kj,a n dk%, we now attempt to dis-
tinguish the implications of projection bias on these three dimensions. We begin by assuming that
the person fully understands exogenous factors, and consider the effects of an underappreciation of
negative internalities and habit formation — that is, we consider k% ’ f and k4ckj ￿ f. Propo-
sition 5.1 establishes that projection bias on either of these dimensions leads to over-consumption
of addictive products.
35
Proposition 5.1. Suppose k% ’f . If either k4 : f or kj : f, then for all &￿ ￿ f, jc4 : f,














with weak inequalities. However, in each case there also exist examples where the inequalities are strict.
28Theintuitionfortheseover-consumptionresultsissimple: Anunderappreciationforeithernega-
tiveinternalitiesorhabitformationleadsthepersontounderestimatethecosttofuturewell-beingof
hitting now. If aperson underappreciates negative internalities, then she doesnot realizehowmuch
hittingtodaywillhurthertomorrow;andifapersonunderappreciateshabitformation,thenshedoes
not realize how much hitting today will hurt her tomorrow if she plans to refrain tomorrow. Part 2
of Proposition 5.1 emphasizes that over-consumption in period 1 can lead to over-consumption in
period 2. If a person over-consumes in period 1, then she will be more addicted in period 2 than
she would have been had she behaved optimally in period 1, and higher addiction levels make a
person more prone to consume.
Although Proposition 5.1 establishes that an underappreciation for negative internalities and an
underappreciation forhabit formation both leadto over-consumption, therearedifferencesbetween
the two errors. Proposition 5.2 shows that these biases have different implications for dynamic
inconsistency:
Proposition 5.2. Suppose k% ’ f. For all &￿ ￿ f, jc4 : f, ￿ 5 dfc￿o,a n d%￿c% 2 5 U, for any
k4 5 dfc￿o:
(1) If kj ’f , then ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿’￿￿
2 ES￿￿ for S￿ 5 ifc￿j,a n d
(2) If kj : f, then ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿￿ and ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef￿.
Part 1 of Proposition 5.2 establishes that if a person fully appreciates both habit formation and
exogenous variability, then she will be dynamically consistent; an underappreciation of negative
internalities does not itself lead to dynamic inconsistency. If a person underappreciates the adverse
effects of addictive products on her day-to-day life, then she may be surprised (and upset) at her
overall level of well-being next year. But because she is not surprised by her desire to hit, she
will behave according to her original plans. Hence, when over-consumption is driven by an un-
derappreciation of negative internalities, it is merely because hitting looks less costly than it really
is. Part 2 of Proposition 5.2 establishes that whenever a person underappreciates habit formation,
however, she will bedynamically inconsistent: She underestimates thelikelihood of hitting tomor-
row following hitting today, and also underestimates thelikelihood of restraint tomorrowfollowing
restraint today.
29These over-consumption results hold for any addiction level. Hence, while one implication
is that an initially unaddicted person might develop a harmful addiction when she shouldn’t, a
second implication is that an initially addicted person might choose to stay addicted when she
shouldn’t. Addicts who should quit may feel that it is not worth becoming unaddicted because they
underappreciate the degree to which their persistently strong craving is linked to their addiction.
We now assume that the person fully understands negative internalities and habit formation, and
consider the effects of an underappreciation of exogenous factors — that is, we consider k4 ’
kj ’fand k% : f. Proposition 5.3 establishes that whether a person is over-optimistic or over-
pessimistic about future behavior depends on whether the exogenous temptation will be larger or
smaller in the future than it is currently:
Proposition 5.3. Suppose k4 ’ kj ’f . For all &￿ ￿ f, jc4 : f, ￿ 5 dfc￿o,a n d%￿c% 2 5 U,f o r
any k% 5 Efc￿o:
(1) If %￿ :% 2, then ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ for S￿ 5 ifc￿j,a n d
(2) If %￿ ￿% 2, then ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ for S￿ 5 ifc￿j.
Part 1 of Proposition 5.3 says thatif theexogenous temptation ishighernowthan it will bein the
future, thepersonoverestimatesthelikelihoodthat shewill hit in period2whether she ispredicting
her behavior following hitting or refraining. The intuition is simple: If the person projects today’s
large exogenous temptation onto tomorrow’s small exogenous temptation, then she perceives the
utility from hitting tomorrow to be larger than it actually is, and therefore is over-pessimistic about
hitting in the future. Part 2 says that the reverse result holds if the exogenous temptation now is
smaller than it will be in the future; the intuition is analogous.
Consider next period-1 behavior. Suppose %￿ :% 2. The direct effect of mispredicting future
utility is that the person projects today’s large exogenous temptation onto tomorrow’s small ex-
ogenous temptation, and therefore perceives the utility from hitting tomorrow to be larger than it
actually is. Since hitting tomorrow is more likely following hitting today (Lemma 5.1), this direct
effect makes a person too likely to hit today. Moreover, the indirect effect is that the person is over-
pessimistic about the likelihood of future restraint, which further reduces the perceived future cost
of hitting. Hence, both effects imply that the person is too likely to hit in period 1. An analogous
logic applies when %￿ ￿% 2. This logic is summarized in Proposition 5.4:
30Proposition 5.4. Suppose k4 ’ kj ’ f. For all &￿ ￿ f, %￿c% 2 5 U, jc4 : f,a n d￿ 5 dfc￿o,f o r
any k% 5 Efc￿o:










Extrapolating from our model, our resultssuggest that peoplemay over-react to exogenous vari-
abilityinthedesiretoconsume—theyaretoolikelytogiveintolargetemptations,andtoounlikely
to givein to small temptations. When peoplehaveastrong desireto consume, they wrongly predict
that the strong desire will persist into the future and therefore that they will consume a lot in the
future, and as a result decide they might as well consume now. Analogously, when people have a
weak desire to consume, they wrongly predict that the desire will remain weak in the future and
therefore that they will consume very little in the future, and as a result they decide they should
refrain now.
6. Cooling Off
In a variety of situations, people make irreversible (or difficult-to-reverse) decisions when they are
in a ‘‘hot’’ state that is unlikely to persist — people buy automobiles when the dealer has them
excited, get married in the heat of passion, and commit suicide when depression is particularly in-
tense. Sincethecurrentstateof mind affectswell-being andwill persist to somedegree, responding
toit isnot perse amistake. But projectionbiasleads peopleto underappreciatethedegreetowhich
intense feelings will dissipate, and hence people may be too likely to make an irreversible or oth-
erwise costly decision. This suggests a useful policy prescription: Impose ‘‘cooling-off periods’’
that force people to delay before making irreversible decisions.
In this section, we use our model of projection bias to explore the role of cooling-off periods.
We concentrate on one particular economic application: the purchase of a durable good, such as
an automobile, when sellers can exert effort to get consumers ‘‘excited’’ about a purchase. We
present a simple, extremely stylized model that identifies some basic intuitions that should hold
more generally.
Suppose that a person goes to a dealer to possibly purchase a durable good. The dealer quotes a
price ￿, and also engages in ‘‘sales hype’’ ￿. After she observes ￿ and experiences ￿, the person
31decides whether to buy the product. If she does not buy the product, then her intertemporal utility
is zero. If shebuys the product, shewill enjoy thebenefitsof ownership, but must forego thefuture
benefits she could have financed with wealth ￿.
The person derives ownership benefits from two sources, the intrinsic usefulness of the product
and the excitement of ownership. Each period the product provides intrinsic value >. The dealer’s
sales hype creates excitement level ￿, but this excitement decays over time at rate ￿ 5 Efc￿￿;s i n c e
hype occurs in period 1, the person’s excitement level in period ￿ is ￿￿3￿￿. Hence, the person’s
instantaneous utility function is ￿ES￿cr ￿￿’S￿ ￿ E> n r￿￿, where consumption is S￿ ’￿if the
person owns the good in period ￿ and S￿ ’fotherwise, and the state is r￿ ’ ￿￿3￿￿. The person
has discount rate B￿￿; for much of the analysis below, it is more natural and useful to interpret B
as also reflecting the probability that the product purchased will break or be lost.
We consider a monopoly dealer who faces a single cohort of potential customers. In period 1,
all consumers enter the store, and each customer either buys the product in period 1 or never buys
the product. Consumers differ in their intrinsic valuation of the product >,w h e r e> is distributed
uniformly oninterval dfcfo. The dealer cannot observe>, and thereforemust offer the same￿ and
￿ to all customers. But we assume that all customers have the same simple projection bias k,a n d
that the dealer knows k. The dealer faces constant marginal cost of production _ ￿ f. In addition,
sales hype ￿ requires cost ￿E￿￿,w h e r e￿￿ : f and ￿￿￿ : f.
We begin by assuming that contracts areirreversible.
36 If a consumer chooses to buy the product
in period 1, then she must pay the price ￿ and take possession immediately (i.e., S￿ ’ ￿ for all
￿ ￿ ￿). In such an environment, the person should buy the product if and only if the discounted







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ f.
Projection bias leads the person to exaggerate the stream of benefits she will get from the ex-












￿ ￿￿ ￿ f.
Both optimal behavior and actual behavior can be characterized by a cutoff rule: There exist
69 A morerealistic assumptionwould bethat theparties could writereversible contracts if they wished. Butgiven our
(extreme) assumptions, customers see no benefits of flexibility, and the dealer, because he is aware of the customer’s
projection bias, strictly prefers an irreversible contract to a reversible contract.
327 >WE￿c￿￿ and 7 >￿E￿c￿￿ such that people should buy the product if and only if > ￿ 7 >WE￿c￿￿, but
people actually buy the product if and only if > ￿ 7 >￿E￿c￿￿. Lemma 6.1 compares how people
actually behave to how they should behave:
Lemma 6.1. For any ￿ and ￿, >WE￿c￿￿ ￿ >￿E￿c￿￿’k
BE￿3￿￿
￿3B￿ ￿.
Anyone with > 5 d>￿E￿c￿￿c>WE￿c￿￿￿ makes an irreversible purchase that they shouldn’t;
Lemma 6.1 therefore establishes that if the dealer engages in any sales hype at all (￿:f), too
many people make the irreversible purchase. This result is a simple implication of the fact that
projection bias leads a person to exaggerate the stream of benefits she will get from the excitement
of ownership. Lemma 6.1 also yields some simple comparative statics. First, the quicker a person
cools off — the smaller is ￿ — the more likely she is to buy when sheshouldn’t. The quicker a per-
son coolsoff, themorehertruefuture preferencesdiffer from hercurrent preferences, and therefore
the bigger is the error caused by projection bias. Second, the more patient is a person or the longer
lasting is the product being purchased— the larger is B — the more likely she is to buy when she
shouldn’t. Projection bias makes the person perceive that her future utility from the product will be
larger than it actually is; hence the more she cares about the distant future benefits of the product,
the bigger the errors she makes. Third, the bigger is the projection bias — the bigger is k —t h e
more likely the person is to buy when she shouldn’t.
While these comparative statics reflect some important intuitions, and parallel some of our ear-
lier examples, we are also interested in the fact that ￿ is endogenous — it is chosen by the dealer.
If people buy whenever > ￿ 7 >E￿c￿￿, then, recalling that > is distributed uniformly on dfcfo,t h e
dealer faces demand function (E7 >E￿c￿￿￿ ’ f ￿ 7 >E￿c￿￿￿ Given constant production cost _ ￿ f
and cost of sales hype ￿E￿￿, the dealer’s payoff function is
37
E￿ ￿_￿ ￿ (E7 >E￿c￿￿￿ ￿ ￿E￿￿.
If people were fully rational, then the dealer would face demand (E7 >WE￿c￿￿￿;w el e tE￿Wc￿
W￿
denote what optimal dealer behavior would be if people were fully rational. But the dealer actually
faces demand (E7 >￿E￿c￿￿￿;w el e tE￿￿c￿
￿￿ denote optimal dealer behavior when the dealer is
6: We assume [ is sufficiently large and F is sufficiently convex to guarantee an interior solution. In particular,
[Ag , F3+3, @ 3,a n dF33+!, A ^+4 ￿￿,+4 ￿￿,@+4￿￿￿,.￿‘5@^5+4 ￿￿,‘ for all ! guarantees an interior solution
for both optimal and actual behavior.
33awarethat people haveprojection bias. Proposition 6.1 describeshowprojection biasaffectsdealer
behavior:




￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿E￿￿c￿
￿￿ : 7 >WE￿Wc￿
W￿ ￿ 7 >￿E￿Wc￿
W￿.
Part 1 of Proposition 6.1 states that a monopoly dealer who is aware that people have projection
bias distorts upwards both sales hype and the price. Sales hype causes a person with projection
bias to overvalue theproduct. If dealers areaware that peoplehave projection bias, they (correctly)
perceive a larger marginal return to sales hype, and therefore choose more sales hype than they
would if people were fully rational. The increased price further takes advantage of the increased
value, both real and perceived, created by sales hype.
38
Part 2 of Proposition 6.1 emphasizes that the dealer takes advantage of people: Because those
people with > 5 d7 >￿E￿c￿￿c7 >WE￿c￿￿￿ buy the product when they shouldn’t, Part 2 establishes
that the dealer reacts to projection bias in a way that increases the number of incorrect purchases.
We should also note that the dealer’s reaction changes the identity of those who make incorrect
purchases, in waysthat depend on therelative magnitudesof theincreases insaleshypeand price.
39
We now consider imposing a cooling-off period that forces people to delay for some duration
before making the irreversible decision of buying the product. For ease of exposition, we focus on
a mandatory one-period delay: Consumers who choose to buy the product in period 1 cannot take
possession until period 2, and they have the option to cancel the contract in period 2 rather than
take possession. Formally, we assume that if a consumer chooses to buy the product in period 1,
then she pays the price ￿ in period 1. In period 2, the person either takes possession, in which case
S￿ ’￿for all ￿ ￿ 2, or cancels the contract and gets a full refund.
6; That the increased demand created by sales hype increases rather than decreases the profit-maximizing price of
course depends on our assumption about the distribution of tastes, which yields a linear demand function.
6< While the dealer’s reaction increases the number of customers who suffer negative utility, it could be that total
consumer surplus increases. Intuitively, if the dealer’s response involves a sufficiently large increase in sales hype,
then all customers who would have made the purchase at +S ￿>!
￿, will be better off despite the higher price. Since
the increased sales hype increases the product’s value while the increased price decreases the product’s value, the net
effect of the dealer’s reaction could be to increase or decrease the product’s value. In the event that the product’s value
decreases, total consumer surplus necessarily decreases. In the event that the product’s value increases, total consumer
surplus might increase or decrease depending on the relative magnitudes of the two effects — increased product value
for all, but more incorrect purchases.






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ f.
Because the cooling-off period delays possession by one period, the person loses period-1 owner-
ship benefits E> n ￿￿; otherwise, this condition is identical to that under binding contracts. This
inequality defines the cutoff 7 >WWE￿c￿￿ for optimal behavior.












￿ ￿￿ ￿ f.
Once again, this condition is identical to that under binding contracts except for losing the period-1
ownership benefits E> n ￿￿. But since the person will have cooled off somewhat before period
2, she might cancel the contract in period 2. The person’s state in period 2 will be r2 ’ ￿￿,a n d
she will project this smaller excitement level onto her future preferences. She will therefore take




















Our focus shall beonwhether thepersonactuallytakespossession; thislatter inequalitydefinesthe
cutoff 7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿ such that a person actually completes the contract if and only if > ￿ 7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿.
Lemma 6.2 describes how a one-period cooling-off period affects behavior (holding dealer be-
havior fixed):
Lemma 6.2. For any ￿ and ￿,
(1) 7 >WWE￿c￿￿ : 7 >WE￿c￿￿ and 7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿ : 7 >￿E￿c￿￿,a n d
(2) 7 >WWE￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >WE￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿E￿c￿￿.
Lemma 6.2 reflects the basic trade-off associated with a mandatory cooling-off period. Part 1
reflects the costs of a cooling-off period: Fewer people buy the product. By delaying possession,
people must give up both the intrinsic value and ownership excitement that they would have re-
ceived in period 1. But part 2 reflects the potential benefits of a cooling-off period: Fewer people
buy the product when they shouldn’t. A cooling-off period is exactly that — people must take time
73 That the price S is multiplied by the factor 4@￿ reflects that the price paid in period 1 is the period-1 discounted
value of forgone future benefits. Since in period 2 those future benefits are one period closer, the period-2 discounted
value is S@￿.
35to cool off and move out of the extreme state. As they do, their current preferences become more
similar to their future preferences, and they are therefore less prone to make the mistake.
Lemma 6.2 describes the benefits of a cooling-off period holding dealer behavior fixed. How
doesthedealerreacttothislaw? Underthecooling-offperiod,thedealerfacesdemand(E7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿￿;
we let E￿ ￿￿c￿
￿￿￿ denote optimal dealer behavior. Proposition 6.2 describes how the dealer re-
sponds to the cooling-off period:
Proposition 6.2. (1) ￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿ and ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿,a n d
(2)7 >WWE￿￿￿c￿
￿￿￿￿7 >￿￿E￿￿￿c￿
￿￿￿ ￿ 7 >WWE￿￿c￿
￿￿￿7 >￿￿E￿￿c￿
￿￿ ￿ 7 >WE￿ ￿c￿
￿￿￿7 >￿E￿￿c￿
￿￿.
Part 1 of Proposition 6.2 establishes that the cooling-off period reduces the dealer’s incentive
to engage in excessive sales hype. Intuitively, the marginal return to sales hype is reduced by the
cooling-off period because the purchase decision is effectively made after the person’s excitement
leveldecayssome. Notethat lesssaleshypealsoleadstoalowerprice. Part2establishesthat fewer
people buy the product when they shouldn’t under the cooling-off period. The second inequality
followsfromLemma6.2—holdingdealerbehaviorfixedatE￿￿c￿
￿￿,thecooling-offperiodmakes
people less likely to buy when they shouldn’t. The first inequality reflects that the effect of the
cooling-off period on dealer behavior — making the dealer reduce sales hype — further enhances
the basic effect.
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Our analysis above does not establish whether a one-period cooling-off law is on net beneficial.
It merely lays out the benefits — fewer people make incorrect purchases — and costs — forgone
short-run benefits. But the logic described above makes clear when cooling-off periods are likely
to be particularly beneficial: when cooling off occurs relatively quickly — i.e., when ￿ is small
— and when short-term ownership benefits are relatively small — i.e., when > n ￿ is small. Of
course, in some environments the costs would be small, as when there is a natural delay before a
good can be enjoyed, or when a customer could return the product in good-as-new condition. In
other situations, the costs could be substantial.
74 Infact, ouranalysis mayunderstatethedegreetowhichfirmswillreducesaleshypeinresponsetoacooling-offlaw
because we assume that cancelled contracts are costless to the dealer. If cancelled contracts were costly for the dealer,
it would reduce sales hype even further to reduce the number of cancelled contracts. Of course, the cancelled-contract
costs would be another social cost of the cooling-off law.
36Moreover, cooling-off periods may be attractive because they can have large benefits for those
with projection bias, while imposing relatively small costs on those who are fully rational. In
particular, for k large and ￿ small, binding contracts may be very damaging, and short cooling-off
periods may (nearly) fix the problem. At the same time, for a fully rational person, a mandated
cooling-off period is costly only to the extent of the short delay before the benefits are initiated.
Cooling-off periods ofthe sort described above are potentially useful forany difficult-to-reverse
decisions that people tend to make under the influence of states of mind that are unlikely to persist.
As discussed at the outset, marriage and suicide also meet these criteria. In the case of marriage,
people often decide to commit themselves when experiencing intense feelings that will not last.
The failure to appreciate the transience of these feelings not only results in marriages that probably
shouldn’t take place, but may also lessen the perceived need for steps, such as prenuptial agree-
ments, that could lessen the negative impacts of divorce. Many states and religions, in fact, place
barriers to impulsive marriage, including long engagement periods, waiting periods for marriage
certificates, or medical teststhat taketime. Such restrictionssuggest that theremay besomeaware-
nessofprojection biasand ofthebenefitsof coolingoff. In thecaseofsuicide, peopleoften commit
suicide in the midst of extreme depression or hopelessness. There is a common assertion in writ-
ings on depression (see, e.g., Solomon 1998, p. 49) that depressed people are unable to imagine
that they will feel better — i.e., not depressed — in the future, suggesting that both clinical and
situational depression and situational hopelessness are subject to projection bias. While explicit
cooling-off periods for suicide would be awkward and difficult to enforce, de facto cooling-off pe-
riods areimposed legally and socially when thenorm isto intervenein observed cases of attempted
suicide, or to pay special attention to suicide attempts by people in bad situations.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
Our goal in this paper has been to improve the realism of formal economic models of intertemporal
choice by incorporating under the rubric of projection bias a range of related psychological phe-
nomena of how people mispredict their preferences. Our analysis in Sections 4, 5, and 6 highlights
the potential economic importance of projection bias. Rather than choose applications that would
highlight qualitative differences between our model and therational-choicemodel, wehave chosen
applications that demonstrate two different categories of projection-bias implications.
37First, projection bias makes sounder quantitative predictions. For instance, acquiring a harm-
ful addiction is consistent in principle with both the rational-choice model and the projection-bias
model. But under reasonable assumptions about how the pleasure from consumption compares
to the magnitude of future harm, the rational-choice model requires absurd levels of impatience
whereas our projection-bias model could predict the same behavior with more reasonable levels of
impatience.
Second, projection bias improves welfare analysis. Researchers outside the field of economics
take it for granted that people sometimes behave in suboptimal ways. While many economists
likely share this opinion, they often view such issues as outside the domain of economics. By
introducing into formal models a behaviorally-based, precise articulation of a systematic error, our
model of projection bias helps facilitate a principled analysis of the ways in which people behave
suboptimally in economic environments, and thus allows more accurate welfare conclusions.
Many of these issues also apply to another psychological phenomenon that has received increas-
ing attention from economists: time-inconsistent discounting and self-control problems. It is worth
briefly distinguishing the two phenomena, particularly since both can give rise to dynamic incon-
sistency. Recent formalmodelsofself-control problemsarebasedon along tradition inpsychology
—andincommonsense—that peoplehavea time-inconsistent tastefor immediategratification.
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A person with self-control problems may or may not mispredict her future behavior: If the person
is sophisticated and fully understands her future self-control problems, she will be dynamically
consistent; but if she is naive and underestimates her future self-control problems, she will system-
atically over-estimate the likelihood of behaving herself in the future.
Insofar as projection bias and naivete about self-control problems both involve misprediction of
futureintertemporalutility functions,they areofcourserelated. They mayalso sharepsychological
underpinnings, becauseboth involve afailure by peopleto appreciate howtheir futurefeelings will
differ from their current feelings. But the two sources of dynamic inconsistency are distinguished
by the object of the person’s misprediction: Whereas projection bias is a misprediction of future
instantaneousutilities,naiveteaboutself-controlproblemsisamisprediction oftherelativeweights
she will attach to future instantaneous utilities.
In many contexts, it is difficult to disentangle whether mispredictions of future behavior are
75 See Ainslie (1992), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Thaler (1991) for reviews of the evidence on self-control
problems. Such time-inconsistent preferences were first formally studied in economics by Strotz (1956), and more
recently by Laibson (1994,1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), and others.
38coming from projection bias or naivete about self-control problems. Consider, for instance, the
tendency to underpredict the propensity to yield to sexual desire in the future. People may go on
dates planning to refrain from unsafe sexual contact, but then in the heat of the moment behave
in ways that they had not predicted. Both projection bias and naivete about self-control problems
can play a role in this phenomenon. Projection bias generates the misprediction because the person
does not fully appreciate in a cool state how tempting sex will be in a hot state. Naivete about self-
control problems generates the misprediction because the person does not appreciate how prone
she will be to pursue activities that yield her immediate gratification.
But projection bias and naivete about self-control problems often generate distinct predictions.
Indeed, several of the mispredictions discussed in this paper can clearly come only from projection
bias and not from naivete about self-control problems. For instance, neither Loewenstein, Nagin,
and Paternoster’s (1997) finding that males’ predictions about behaving in a sexually aggressive
fashion depended on their current arousal nor Read and van Leeuwen’s (1998) finding that people’s
choices of snacks depended on their current hunger can be explained by naivete about self-control
problems; projection bias is clearly implicated.
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While we hope we have already made our case for the broad applicability of projection bias,
we now briefly speculate about three additional economic applications. Social-comparison theory,
which studies the ways a person cares about her status relative to a comparison group, is a major
topic in psychological research, and has recently received more attention among economists. Be-
cause people often make decisions, such as switching jobs, that cause their comparison groups to
change, we suspect that projection bias in the form of underappreciating the effects of a change in
comparison groups may be important in this context.
As a concrete example inspired by Frank (1985), consider a person’s decision whether to switch
jobs. Suppose the jobs differ in two types of status they offer the person. They provide her with
‘‘general status’’ — theprestige accorded to the job by society at large— and ‘‘local status’’ — how
her status compares to the average of those in her comparison group. When deciding whether to
switchjobs, thepersonshouldoptimallyweighthetrade-offbetweengeneralstatusandlocalstatus.
76 A second result in Read and van Leeuwen (1998) seems to implicate self-control problems and not projection bias:
Subjects were asked at the time the snacks were delivered whether they would like to switch, and whereas very few
people (5%) who chose an unhealthy snack changed their minds and requested a healthy snack, a large fraction (71%)
of subjects who chose a healthy snack changed their minds and requested an unhealthy snack. This asymmetry in
switching behavior is exactly what we would expect to see if people have self-control problems wherein they prefer to
eat healthy snacks in the future while at the same time they prefer to eat the unhealthy snacks now.
39But if projection bias leads the person to underappreciate the effects of a changing comparison
group, and if the comparison group affects local status but not general status, then the person will
under-pursue local status and therefore over-pursue general status. As a result, the person will be
too likely to choose a high-status job whose comparison group has high average status. Graduate
studentsmay,forexample,betoolikelytotakeajobatHarvard becausetheybelievetheshort-term,
local-status effect of prestige amongtheir current comparisongroup (fellow graduatestudents) will
persist. They do not fully appreciate that once they get to Harvard they won’t impress their new
comparison group (colleagues at Harvard) with the fact that they have a job at Harvard.
A broader, but more speculative, economic application of projection bias is to diminishing mar-
ginal utility. Traditional consumer theory assumes that recent consumption of aproduct reducesthe
marginal utility from further consumption. Eating a second pint of ice cream yields less pleasure
than the first, and watching a Johnny Depp movie for the 30|￿ time generates less pleasure than
watching it for merely the 3h_ time. While consumer theory usually suppresses the temporal na-
tureof diminishingmarginal utility, it maybeimportant whenapersonsuffers fromprojectionbias.
Most peopleunderstand satiation: Weall realize that eating thesecond pint of icecream will beless
satisfying than the first. But from anecdotal evidence and intuition — and from extrapolating the
hungerfindingsdiscussed earlier —wesuspectthat projectionbiasleadspeopleto underappreciate
these effects. That is, we suspect that people tend to project their current marginal utility of con-
sumption onto their future marginal utility, and hence act as if our utility function for consumption
of a good is less concave than it actually is.
If people extrapolate marginal utilities in this way, then they will be prone to over-purchase
activitiestheycurrentlydon’tengagein. Peoplemayplanoverly longvacations, believingtheninth
day lyingon thebeach willbenearly asenjoyableasthefirst; and professionalswhohavelittletime
for reading or traveling may falsely anticipate the blissfulness of spending their retirement years
with non-stop reading and traveling. Firms may, of course, take advantage of such mispredictions,
justastheyexploited over-heatedconsumersinSection6,bysellinglong-termcontractsforaseries
ofpurchases. Forinstance,wesuspectthatinitialpurchaseagreementsforbook-of-the-monthclubs
and yearly passesto gymsarean attempt to takeadvantageof peoplewho arecurrently enthusiastic
about reading or working out at the gym. On a shorter time-scale, we suspect that restaurants take
advantage of projection bias by offering all-you-can-eat meals to hungry diners who don’t realize
that they will become satiated relatively quickly.
40Our final economic application involves extending projection bias to the interpersonal domain:
Perhaps people make the same types of mistakes in predicting other people’s preferences and be-
havior that they make in predicting their own behavior. Indeed, V an Boven, Dunning and Loewen-
stein (1999) provide evidence of such interpersonal projection bias and illustrate some potential
economic implications. In one experiment, the usual endowment effect was replicated by elicit-
ing selling prices from subjects endowed with coffee mugs and buying prices from subjects not
endowed. But sellers were then asked to estimate how much buyers would pay and buyers to
estimate how much sellers would charge, with all subjects rewarded for accurate predictions. Con-
sistent with interpersonal projection bias, sellers over-estimated buying prices, and buyers under-
estimated selling prices.
In further experiments, some subjects (‘‘sellers’’) were given mugs and privately asked their
minimum selling prices. Other subjects (‘‘buyers’ agents’’) were given $10 to purchase a mug on
behalf of a buyer, and told to make a single offer to one seller which would be either accepted or
rejected based on the seller’s stated minimum selling price. Buyers’ agents were told that if their
offer was accepted they could keep the difference between the $10 and the amount that they bought
the mug for. If their offer was rejected they would get nothing. In one (representative) experiment,
the mean offer was $5.54, but the mean minimum selling price was $6.98; only 29% of offers
were accepted, and the average earnings of buyers’ agents was $.85. At the profit-maximizing
offer of $7.00, 66% of offers would have been accepted, and average earnings would have been
$2.00. Further experiments showed that the buyers’ agents’ interpersonal error resulted from an
intrapersonal error — from their tendency to underestimate the price at which they themselves
would sell the mug.
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By demonstrating that people can actually lose money by failing to appreciate projection bias,
and hence have incentives to overcome the bias, this last application raises the question of whether
projection bias disappears with experience. That projection bias operates on states such as hunger
with which people should have ample experience suggests that projection bias does not disappear.
A possible explanation for the persistence of projection bias is Loewenstein’s (1996) hypothesis
that projection bias applies retrospectively. Just as a person may not fully attend to all relevant
utility changes when making decisions, she may not fully attend to all relevant utility changes
77 These experiments also provide some insight into how projection bias persists even in settings with feedback:
Buyers’ agents interpreted failures to transact as greed on the part of sellers, only slowly learned from experience that
their offers were too low, and even then failed to generalize the lesson to other goods.
41when reflecting on past behavior. Such a retrospective projection bias may explain the tendency
to forget how one actually behaved — to think that one ate less than one actually ate, displayed
less anger than one did, etc. — and to view the elements of past behavior that one does recall as
inexplicable and flukish. The failure to recall one’s behavior and to view it as flukish may prevent
learning from experience.
At the same time, there is reason to believe that people are aware of projection bias on some
meta-level: A person might be aware that when sheshopstomorrowshe will suffer from projection
bias, and yet when tomorrow arrives she will be unaware that she currently suffers from the bias.
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Indeed, that ‘‘never shop on an empty stomach’’ is such a part of folk wisdom suggests people
are aware of projection bias. In addition, we suspect that many rules people develop are designed
to deal with moment-by-moment projection bias. For instance, in the context of our cooling-off
model, people might develop rules such as never buy a car the first time you visit a dealer. Such
rules maybe quiteimportant —andalsomaybefurther evidencethat peoplesufferfrom projection
bias. But as a careful analysis of such rules is beyond the scope of this paper, we leave the analysis
for future research.
As models that reflect the reality of both short-term fluctuations and long-term changes in pref-
erences become more widespread in economics, economists must seriously address the question
of whether people accurately predict how their preferences will change. Much as there has been a
growing recognition among economists that behavioral and welfare economics will be improved
by developing models that incorporate self-control problems, we hope our analysis and examples
illustrate the potential benefits for both behavioral and welfare economics of incorporating mispre-
dictions of utilities in general, and projection bias in particular, into formal economic analysis.
78 As we discuss in Section 3, thevery essenceof projection bias requires thatat any moment when the person suffers
from projection bias she must be unaware of that fact.
42Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Let ￿ ￿ EU￿cU2c￿￿￿cUA￿ and suppose ￿ induces states Et￿ct2c￿￿￿ctA￿.
Let ￿￿ ￿ EU￿
￿cU￿
2c￿￿￿cU￿
A￿ and suppose ￿￿ induces states Et￿
￿ct￿
2c￿￿￿ct￿
A￿. Then define ￿ T |E￿ct|￿ ￿
SA
￿’| B
￿￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿, which is the continuation utility perceived in period | from following con-
sumption path ￿ in all periods. Suppose ￿ is the optimal consumption path perceived in pe-
riod 1 — that is, ￿ maximizes ￿ T ￿E￿ct￿￿. The person is dynamically consistent if for all ￿￿
such that for some 7 ￿:￿, U￿
￿ ’ U￿ for all ￿￿7 ￿ (and therefore t￿
￿ ’ t￿ for all ￿ ￿ 7 ￿),
￿ T |E￿ct|￿ ￿ ￿ T |E￿￿ct|￿ for all | ￿ 7 ￿. We now prove that the conditions in Proposition 3.1
are sufficient for the person to be dynamically consistent. For all |, ￿ T |E￿ct|￿ ￿ ￿ T |E￿￿ct|￿ ’
SA
￿’| B
￿ d￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿
￿mt|￿o.S i n c eU￿
￿ ’ U￿ for all ￿￿7 ￿, which implies t￿
￿ ’ t￿ for all
￿ ￿ 7 ￿, ￿ T |E￿ct|￿ ￿ ￿ T |E￿￿ct|￿ ’
SA
￿’7 ￿ B
￿ d￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿
￿mt|￿o for all | ￿ 7 ￿. Note that
￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿
￿mt|￿ ’￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿mt|￿ n￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿
￿mt|￿. The first
condition in Proposition 3.1 implies ￿ ￿EU￿ct￿mt|￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿mt|￿ is independent of t|. The second
condition of the Proposition 3.1 implies ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿mt|￿￿ ￿ ￿EU￿
￿ct￿
￿mt|￿ is independent of t|. Hence, for
all |￿| ￿ ￿ 7 ￿, ￿ T |E￿ct|￿ ￿ ￿ T |E￿￿ct|￿ ’ ￿ T |￿E￿ct|￿￿ ￿ ￿ T |￿E￿￿ct|￿￿. Finally, because ￿ maximizes
￿ T ￿E￿ct￿￿, we know ￿ T ￿E￿ct￿￿ ￿ ￿ T ￿E￿￿ct￿￿ ￿ f, and the result follows. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1: (1) Letting -￿E%￿’ 7 - for all %, the first-order conditions become
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Proof of Proposition 4.2: (1) The first-order conditions for optimal and planned behavior are as
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￿￿ is the Lagrange multiplier. Because -￿ES2￿￿S￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ E￿￿k￿-￿ES2￿￿S￿
￿ ￿ ￿nk-￿ES2￿ for
any S2, b
￿￿ ￿ b
￿ would imply S￿
2 : ￿ S￿
2 and ,￿
2 ￿ ￿ ,￿
2 , which would violate the budget constraint.
Hence, it must be that b
￿￿ :b
￿, which implies ,￿
2 ￿ ￿ ,￿
2 . The budget constraint then implies
S￿
2 : ￿ S￿
2 .Q . E . D .
Proof of Lemma 5.1: (1) If the person hits in period 1, then &2 ’ ￿&￿ n￿ ; hence ￿W
2E￿ ￿’￿if
and only if ￿E￿cE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿￿ ￿ ￿EfcE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿￿ or %2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ . If the person refrains
in period 1, then &2 ’ ￿&￿; hence ￿W
2Ef ￿’￿if and only if ￿E￿cE￿&￿c% 2￿￿ ￿ ￿EfcE￿&￿c% 2￿￿ or
%2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿￿. Hence if ￿W
2Ef ￿’￿then ￿W
2E ￿ ￿’￿ .
(2) If the person hits in period 1, then &2 ’ ￿&￿ n￿;h e n c e ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿ ￿’￿if and only if ￿ ￿E￿cE￿&￿ n
￿c% 2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EfcE￿&￿ n￿ c% 2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿ or E￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿ ￿ ￿jdE￿ ￿ kj￿E￿&￿ n
￿￿ n kjE&￿￿o. If the person refrains in period 1, then &2 ’ ￿&￿; hence ￿ ￿￿
2 E f ￿’￿if and only
if ￿ ￿E￿cE￿&￿c% 2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿EfcE￿&￿c% 2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿ or E￿￿k%￿%2 nk%%￿ ￿ ￿jdE￿￿kj￿E￿&￿￿n
kjE&￿￿o. Hence if ￿ ￿￿
2 E f ￿’￿then ￿ ￿￿
2 E ￿ ￿’￿ . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.2: (1) Define T 2E&￿ ￿ 4@ SMtfc￿￿ ￿EScE&c%2￿￿, in which case it is optimal to
hit in period 1 if and only if %￿ n j& ￿ BdT 2E￿&￿ ￿ T 2E￿& n ￿￿o. T 2E&￿ is the upper envelope of
thefunctions ￿EfcE&c%2￿￿ and ￿E￿cE&c%2￿￿, and since￿EfcE&c%2￿￿and ￿E￿cE&c%2￿￿are decreasing
45linear functions of &, T 2E&￿ is weakly convex, and therefore dT 2E￿&￿ ￿ T 2E￿& n ￿￿o is weakly
decreasing in &.G i v e n%￿ n j& is increasing in &, the result follows.
(2) Define ￿ T 2E&￿ ￿ 4@ SMtfc￿￿ ￿ ￿EScE&c%2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿, in which case the person hits in period 1 if
a n do n lyif%￿nj& ￿ Bd￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&n￿￿o.S i n c e￿ T 2E&￿istheupperenvelopeof thedecreasing
linear functions ￿ ￿EfcE&c%2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿ and ￿ ￿E￿cE&c%2￿mE&￿c% ￿￿￿, it is weakly convex, and therefore
d￿ T 2E￿&￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿& n ￿￿o is weakly decreasing in &.G i v e n %￿ n j& is increasing in &,t h er e s u l t
follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.1: (1) We prove T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿for
any &￿ ￿ f, from which the result follows. First note that for any &￿ and &2, T 2E&2￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E&2￿’
4@ i%2 ￿ 4&2c￿4&2 ￿ j&2j
￿4@ i%2 ￿4dE￿ ￿ k4￿&2 n k4&￿oc￿4dE￿ ￿ k4￿&2 n k4&￿o￿ jdE￿ ￿kj￿&2 n kj&￿oj
’ 4k4E&￿ ￿ &2￿ n 4@ i%2c￿j&2j￿4@ i%2c￿jdE￿ ￿ kj￿&2 n kj&￿oj.
If&2 ’ ￿&￿ ￿ &￿, then4k4E&￿￿&2￿ ￿ fand4@ i%2c￿j&2j￿4@ i%2c￿jdE￿￿kj￿&2nkj&￿oj,
and therefore T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ f.I f &2 ’ ￿&￿ n￿￿ &￿, then 4k4E&￿ ￿ &2￿ ￿ f and
4@ i%2c￿j&2j￿4@ i%2c￿jdE￿￿kj￿&2nkj&￿oj,andthereforeT 2E￿&￿n￿￿￿￿ T 2E￿&￿n￿￿ ￿ f.
Then T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ f ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿implies T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿￿
￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿ .
(2) Because period 2 is the final period, ￿￿
2 ES￿￿’￿W


















2 follows from Lemma 5.1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: Because period 2 is the final period, ￿￿
2 ES￿￿’￿W
2ES￿￿ for S￿ 5 ifc￿j.
The proof of part 1 of Lemma 5.1 then implies that ￿￿
2 E￿ ￿’￿if and only if %2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ ,
and ￿￿
2 Ef ￿’￿if and only if %2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿￿.G i v e nk% ’ f, the proof of part 2 of Lemma 5.1
implies ￿ ￿￿
2 E ￿ ￿’￿i fa n do n l yi f%2 ￿ ￿jdE￿￿kj￿E￿&￿n￿￿nkjE&￿￿o,an d ￿ ￿￿
2 E f ￿’￿if and only
if %2 ￿ ￿jdE￿￿kj￿E￿&￿￿nkjE&￿￿o. Clearly kj ’fimplies ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿’￿￿
2 ES￿￿ for S￿ 5 ifc￿j.I f
kj : f, then dE￿ ￿ kj￿E￿&￿ n ￿￿ n kjE&￿￿o ￿ ￿&￿ n ￿ and dE￿ ￿ kj￿E￿&￿￿nkjE&￿￿o ￿ ￿&￿,a n d
it follows that ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿￿ and ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef￿. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.3: Again, ￿￿
2 E ￿ ￿’￿i fa n do n l yi f%2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ ,a n d￿￿
2 Ef ￿’￿if
46a n do n l yi f%2 ￿ ￿jE￿&￿￿.G i v e nkj ’ f, the proof of part 2 of Lemma 5.1 implies ￿ ￿￿
2 E￿￿ ’ ￿ if
and only if E￿￿k%￿%2nk%%￿ ￿ ￿jE￿&￿ n￿￿,a n d ￿ ￿￿
2 Ef ￿’￿if and only if E￿￿k%￿%2 nk%%￿ ￿
￿jE￿&￿￿. Then %￿ :% 2 implies E￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿ :% 2, and therefore ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ for
S￿ 5 ifc￿j. Similarly, %￿ ￿% 2 implies E￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿ ￿% 2, and therefore ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
2 ES￿￿
for S￿ 5 ifc￿j.Q . E . D .
Proof of Proposition 5.4: First note that for any %￿, %2,a n d&￿,
T
2E￿&￿￿ ￿ T
2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿ ’ 4 @   i%2c￿j￿&￿j￿4@ i%2c￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ j and
￿ T
2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T
2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿ ’ 4 @   idE￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿oc￿j￿&￿j￿
4@ idE￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿oc￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ j.
Next note that 4@ ifc￿j￿&￿j￿4@ ifc￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ j is weakly decreasing in f because




j if f ￿ ￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿
￿j￿&￿ ￿ f if f 5 d￿jE￿&￿ n￿ ￿ c￿j￿&￿o
f if f ￿￿ j￿&￿.
Hence, if %2 :% ￿ then dE￿ ￿ k%￿%2 n k%%￿o ￿% 2, in which case ￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿￿
T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿for all &￿ ￿ f and therefore S￿
￿ ￿ SW
￿. Similarly, if %2 ￿% ￿ then dE￿ ￿
k%￿%2 n k%%￿o :% 2, in which case ￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿￿ T 2E￿&￿￿ ￿ T 2E￿&￿ n￿ ￿for all
&￿ ￿ f and therefore S￿
￿ ￿ SW








￿ ￿, and since
￿W
2E￿￿ ￿ ￿W









Proof of Lemma 6.1: From the inequalities in the text, we can derive
7 >
WE￿c￿￿’E ￿ ￿B￿￿ ￿ dE￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿o￿ and
7 >
￿E￿c￿￿’E ￿ ￿B￿￿ ￿ dE￿ ￿ k￿E￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿B￿￿nko￿.
It follows that 7 >WE￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿E￿c￿￿’d kBE￿ ￿ ￿￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿o￿.Q . E . D .
Proof of Proposition 6.1: (1) First consider the general problem: If ￿ (E￿c￿￿’f ￿ ￿￿ n ￿￿
and the dealer maximizes E￿ ￿ _￿ ￿ ￿ (E￿c￿￿ ￿ ￿E￿￿, then the optimal E ￿ ￿c￿ ￿￿ satisfy
￿ ￿ ’d f n ￿￿ ￿ n ￿_o*2￿
￿
￿E￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿_,
where f:￿ _ , ￿￿Ef￿ ’ f,a n d￿￿￿E￿￿ :￿ 2*E2￿￿ for all ￿ guarantees a unique interior solution.
Combining these equations yields
47￿
￿E￿ ￿￿’d ￿Ef ￿ ￿_￿o*2￿nd ￿
2*E2￿￿o￿ ￿.
Itis straightforwardtoshow ￿ ￿isdecreasing in ￿and increasing in ￿, and therefore ￿ ￿ isdecreasing
in ￿ and increasing in ￿.
For optimal behavior, ￿W ’ ￿ ￿ B and ￿W ’E ￿￿ B￿*E￿ ￿B￿￿; for actual behavior ￿￿ ’ ￿ ￿ B
and ￿￿ ’E ￿￿ k￿E￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿nk. The assumptions f:_ E￿ ￿ B￿*B, ￿￿Ef￿ ’ f,a n d
￿￿￿E￿￿ : dE￿ ￿ k￿E￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿nko2*d2E￿ ￿ B￿o for all ￿ guarantee a unique interior solution
for both optimal and actual behavior; and ￿￿ ’ ￿W and ￿￿ :￿ W imply ￿
￿ :￿
W and ￿￿ :￿ W.
(2) The result follows from ￿
￿ :￿
W and Lemma 6.1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.2: (1) From the inequalities in the text, we can derive
7 >
WWE￿c￿￿’d E ￿ ￿ B￿*Bo￿ ￿ dE￿ ￿B￿*E￿ ￿B￿￿o￿￿ and
7 >
￿￿E￿c￿￿’d E ￿ ￿ B￿*Bo￿ ￿ dE￿ ￿k￿E￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿nko￿￿.
It follows that 7 >WWE￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >WE￿c￿￿ ’ dE￿ ￿ B￿2*Bo￿ n dE￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿oE￿ ￿ ￿￿￿:f and
7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿E￿c￿￿’d E ￿￿ B￿2*Bo￿ n dE￿ ￿ k￿E￿ ￿B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿nkoE￿ ￿ ￿￿￿:f.
(2) 7 >WWE￿c￿￿ ￿ 7 >￿￿E￿c￿￿’d kBE￿ ￿￿￿*E￿￿B￿￿o￿￿ ￿ dkBE￿ ￿￿￿*E￿ ￿B￿￿o￿, and the result
follows from Lemma 6.1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.2: (1) The dealer’s problem falls within the general form in the proof of
Proposition 6.1, where ￿￿￿ ’E ￿￿ B￿*B and ￿￿￿ ’ dE￿ ￿ k￿E￿ ￿ B￿*E￿ ￿ B￿￿nko￿.T h e
assumptions f:_ E￿￿B￿*B, ￿￿Ef ￿’f ,a n d￿￿￿E￿￿ : dE￿￿k￿E￿￿B￿*E￿￿B￿￿nko2*d2E￿￿B￿o
for all ￿ guarantee a unique interior solution; and ￿￿￿ :￿ ￿ and ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ imply ￿
￿￿ ￿￿
￿
and ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.





￿￿￿ ￿ 7 >WWE￿￿c￿
￿￿￿ 7 >￿￿E￿￿c￿
￿￿. The second inequality follows
from Lemma 6.2. Q.E.D.
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